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G-2 Report 6600

A GEMPIKA (Combat)

Subject: Mobilization.

(a) Man Power. ~~Report dated 1st Feb 4 1928~~

The estimated man power available for military purposes is : 1,501,612. The basis of this estimate is as follows:

Total number enrolled during the period 1918-1927 inclusive, reduced by 20%.

Total number enrolled during the period 1909 to 1918 inclusive reduced by 20%.

Total number enrolled during the period 1904 to 1908 inclusive reduced by 30%.

As a check against these figures it may be added that in 1927 the Argentine Government had a general enrollment of all male citizens who had reached their 18th year. The total figure is, 1,969,000. From this must be deducted the two classes of 18 and 19 years of age as they are not available under the present law for military service. This approximates 180,000 men and also must be deducted those who are more than 45 years of age.

Article 21 of the Constitution also provides that naturalized citizens may be exempted from military service for 10 years from the date of naturalization.

Dependent on Argentine resources alone no troops can be armed, equipped and maintained. The country lacks the raw material for munitions and sufficient industries even if raw material were available.

From: M.A. Argentina. Report No. 3854. January 4th 1928

ARGENTINA (Combat)

Subject: Mobilization.

(b) Mobilization of Military personnel.

The mobilization of man power itself is a very easy matter under the Regional and Military District system. That is, the actual gathering together of the men; however equipment and clothing does not exist for the mobilization plan of seven Divisions of Infantry and three of Cavalry, of 160,000 men.

The first and second Divisions could be brought to war strength in ten days. The First Reserve and Second Reserve Division which would have their headquarters and center of mobilization in Buenos Aires and Campo de Mayo respectively could be mobilized armed and equipped at the end of D plus 30 days. For the remaining three Divisions which are to be brought to war strength from the reserves in the provinces, it would take somewhat longer but D plus 60 days is a conservative estimate.

The remaining man power could be called at the rate of 75,000 per month it is believed without interfering with transportation of troops to the frontier.

The above is dependent on uniform & equipment being on hand previous to D day.

The only experience this country has had in mobilization of reserve was in the year 1927 when 4,500 men were called to the colors for a thirty day manoeuvres. These reserves were called and sent to Mendoza Province with the regular troops where they were equipped and armed. The total time of mobilization in the Province of Mendoza of some 20,500 men of the permanent Army and 4,500 of the Reserve, was 10 days. 90 trains were handled by the Buenos Aires Pacific Railway, 45 of which were turned over to them from other railroads. A definite schedule of trains was made out and adhered to strictly by the Army and by the Railroad. All troops were loaded and trains started on schedule time. Only four trains were late with average of 35 minutes. Trains were unloaded at their destination in an average time of 30 minutes.

It is believed from this mobilization of troops that Argentina's Military District System is very good. By troops being ready to entrain on schedule time and transportation officer refusing all request and pleas for change of schedule, they succeeded in carrying out the concentration plan in a most excellent manner.

It should be noted that the above involved only a small number of troops for a definite service. For an unpopular war or even a popular war some trouble may be expected and many would cross the river into Uruguay.

From: M.A. Argentina. Report No. 3854. January 4th, 1928

ARGENTINA (Combat)

Subject: Mobilization.

(c) Powers and limitation of domestic production and supply.

The Argentine Army is dependent on foreign sources for munitions of war.

Small supplies of ammunition for peace time consumption only are manufactured in the Government arsenals.

There are no industrial plants existing capable of manufacturing munitions.

To partially overcome this defect the Government for the past three years has been planning to build a powder factory. A preliminary contract was signed with a German firm, however when they submitted their estimates and plans the latter were disapproved by the Argentine Government and the contract was not completed. It was stated that the Argentine Government itself would construct the plant. Five million pesos have been allotted for this purpose.

Airplane Factory: The Army has constructed an airplane factory in the Province of Cordoba and it has begun operation. The first order is for 50 Avros training planes. These planes will be equipped with foreign made motors.

The Government also desires to move the principal War Arsenal now in Buenos Aires to the Province of Cordoba, but the project failed to become law in the last Congress.

Argentina is lacking in iron, coal, copper, rubber and in fact all the principal raw materials necessary for the manufacture of munitions. For the powder plant it will be necessary to import nitrates.

Sources:

Enrollment 1927
Conversation with Argentine Army Officers
Daily papers.

O. T. Nichols
From: M.A. Argentina. Report No. 3854 January 4th, 1928

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ARGENTINA (Combat - Army)
Subject: Mobilization - General

AFW WAR DEPARTMENT

(c) Powers and Limitations of Domestic Munition Production and Supply.

GENERAL MOBILIZATION

To mobilize means to shift the whole country from the state of peace to that of war. To do this in accordance with modern theories, it is necessary to utilize all available resources without causing prejudice to national life; to organize the production of indispensable elements with a view to maintaining, if not increasing, the offensive power of military forces.

In the first place, preparations for a mobilization require a thorough knowledge of the country's potentiality and a perfect harmony of views on the part of those whose mission it is to ascertain the extent, the degree of utilization, the suitability and the distribution of all available resources.

A distinction may be made between the two great aspects of a general mobilization: the military and the civil, both closely connected.

The object of military mobilization is to provide the Army and the Navy with men, livestock and material as specified by the war organization. Military mobilization is characterized by its rapidity and its strict adjustment to peremptory time limits. Its maximum development occurs during the first phase of war operations; subsequently, the main problem is to foresee casualties and to replace material through the purveying organizations, General Bureaus, by means of industrial mobilization.

Civil mobilization means to organize the entire country with a view to enabling it to face the perturbing crisis resulting from military mobilization; it requires workers engaged in fundamental activities to continue at their work in order not to endanger the present or the future existence of the country. Civil mobilization must fill gaps in the factories and fields with women, children and men unfit for service; it must superintend the consumption of raw material, regulating economic resources and distributing the total energy of of the nation.

Civil mobilization begins with the imminence of war; it embraces economic, financial, administrative and political matters as well as agricultural and livestock problems. It also deals with such branches of commerce, transportation and communications as are not especially placed under military jurisdiction. Its action is intense, vigilant and far-seeing during the course of operations for it must insure the renewal of forces on which the life of the nation depends. It sometimes extends to quite long periods subsequent to the actual period of war; its prolongation is more or less publicly conducted according to the requirements of military demobilization, with a view towards the country's return to normal conditions.

Considering industrial mobilization: This generally begins long before war is declared; it includes all productive military establishments or factories and such private establishments as may be submitted to the military regime when it is deemed indispensable to do so; also all private establishments the capacity of which may have to be applied to the production of war material. Industrial mobilization regulates all activities of this nature in all the remaining establishments. Its work is rapidly intensified and kept at high tension during the entire course of the war.

Industrial mobilization is more elastic than military mobilization, for it cannot be governed by a time schedule inasmuch as it is impossible to expect

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that from the first moment all productive activities may be directed towards the manufacture of war materials. As for the requisition of raw material, it must be absolutely inflexible and must acquire military strictness as regards time-limits, quantities and terms.

In the administrative organization of the aggregate of the factories, it is well to establish a specialized sub-division of the work and a management to harmonize production within the military scope. Only thus will it be in accord with modern conditions under which collective action must take place; there is therefore no imperative urge to subject production to the military system which might prove detrimental. However, this does not imply that the military system should not be applied strictly to certain establishments, as will be noted later in this study.

The alteration of the normal rhythm of vital activities cannot be too sudden that it might endanger the country's future. It would be a great error to believe that it might be possible in Argentina to divert the basic industries from which the country derives all its power and energy. A war might last for several years and such an error might bring about the loss of the economic balance with the consequent results for the maintenance of military forces and domestic order.

TRANSITION FROM THE STATE OF PEACE
TO THAT OF WAR. WAR POTENTIAL AND SPECIFIC
EXHAUSTION.

The Armed forces must harmonize with the country and be a result of the nation's war power. This dependence must be recognized even though at first such a statement may seem to imply undue subjection.

The Argentine proposes to put a million and half men of the first line into the field in the same proportion that countries armed themselves in the last war. Reasonably enough the first objection that would be raised would be that such a number of men would be excessive for Argentina, which country cannot equip an army of that size and much less supply it with munitions.

Should the Argentine provide an army ten times smaller, i.e., 150,000 men, it would be immediately argued that it is in a position to have a much larger standing army. But in keeping with the real situation, the fundamental facts upon which this figure is based are the diversity of probable fronts and the size of the armies of possible enemies. These would seem to justify the largest figure indicated: Argentina would not lack the necessary number of men.

Considering the first limitative cause: The ordinary life of the nation requires about 5 million persons. The rest, excepting a small number of unemployed, is made up of children, women and old men. The activities in which this large portion of the population is engaged are nearly of an indispensable nature and should therefore continue during a war. The majority of the articles of luxury or of those that can be dispensed with are imported, which shows that the activities referred to above are of an imperative nature and must be considered very carefully. It would be possible to take nearly a third of the laboring class away from its usual work while this third could be replaced by women.

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To what extent may the Argentine reduce its activities? The limiting cause does not lie in the difficulty of instructing a larger proportion of each military class in time of peace, since Argentine troops could be better maneuvered with more units: the reason that the annual conscription is restricted is a material consequence of the power derived from the total national economic capacity.

It will be of no avail to specify the size of the Argentine army with a greater or lesser quantity of armaments and material required to equip it efficiently. This is a material factor of great importance, but it is far from being the determining factor. It would not be a difficult proposition to reach a fundamental condition based on numerous armaments. The result would be a very large organization which would rapidly become antiquated and the maintenance of which would be onerous.

The decisive factor and that which ought to exercise the greatest influence on the main characteristics of the army, its armament and regulations, is the wear and tear it must necessarily undergo during operations - the wear and tear caused by the class of war to which it may be subjected.

An army in the field moves from one place to another, fights; it consumes energies of all kinds, it may even be said that it squanders energies in fabulous quantities, sometimes owing to the numbers involved and other to the magnitude or disproportion of the effort to be exerted.

It uses, wears out and destroys material of all kinds.

The relation between the war equipment of troops and what they consume during military operations, whether they be active or not, is extraordinarily unfavorable.

In the case of ammunition, the normal provision must be multiplied by a number varying between 100 and 1000 times according to the caliber. In other words, the replacement of ammunition and material signifies the equipment of an army up to a thousand times larger. This proportion is not the same for all arms. The consumption of energy and material in the Great War was equal to the actual equipment of an army at least twenty times larger; i.e., the replacement is twenty times greater than the equipment of the units.

With reference to equipment, the Argentine General Staff in time of peace has leisurely made purchases without taking into consideration the pressure of war-time limits and replacements under war conditions.

Reserve stocks may somewhat attenuate this resulting crisis. Such stocks have been accumulated, the lack of which would signify a veritable negligence in regard to national safety.

The difference between military and industrial mobilization is that the former completes the equipment; the latter completes the equipping and replaces the wear and tear.

The volume of the material (men and armaments) depends on the greater or lesser capacity to maintain the army on an aggressive basis by supplying it with the necessary elements. The difficulty in this respect lies not in building up the army, but rather in replacements. This is the difference

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between the army of forty years ago and the modern one. After its concentration and strategic distribution, it moved about freely, withdrew to points miles away from vital centers connected with the country by one or two lines of communication through which supplies were insured, especially ammunition; it really encamped in neighboring regions, whereas modern armies move about to shield the country.

Forty years ago, the rapidity with which armies moved was two or three times greater than that of their light-horse-drawn supply columns along the line of communication; the contrary occurs today. Armies move slowly and the velocity and activity of the numerous supply elements are much greater, the frequency of same being such that roads, cement roads, are rapidly worn out.

We need to have an idea of the magnitude of this wear and tear as well as of the time in which it takes place. Furthermore, a new conception seems necessary in the study of the history of war.

Specific wear and tear is that which takes place within a determined length of time, three months, six months or a year. The slowness with which operations are carried out, the greater will that length of time be.

The problem is as follows:

1. Transition from a peace footing to a war footing:

Military mobilization: To complete the Army equipment in accordance with its organization.

Industrial Mobilization: To complete the equipment by means of production during the military mobilization and the concentration of troops.

2. Maintenance at war strength:

Industrial Mobilization: To replace material wear and tear.

Efficiency Factors:

- a) Harmony between the live forces and the army.
- b) Scientific determination of the capacity for war.
- c) Estimation of war needs.
- d) Estimation of probable replacements.
- e) Determination of war plans.

- f) Fundamental characteristics (Organization
(Military Regulations)
- g) Analysis and hypothesis of duration of war: short or long.

It is necessary to bear in mind the influence of the theater of operations, of the army equipment and the national mentality.

Therefore, while Argentines are not conversant with the capacity for war, we shall be unable to talk of organization, order of battle and plans of operations.

Argentina must hasten to obtain a thorough knowledge of her resources and possibilities, on one hand, and on the other, to define the requirements of her army such as it supposes or admits is a priori, to be effectively in harmony with the country.

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The method which should be followed is to establish approximate estimates with ever increasing accuracy while the rational investigation of the country's capacity for war is methodically studied.

It must be pointed out that in the last four years, the country's war strength has increased to an extraordinary degree and its present tendency is remarkably favorable.

To be non-conversant with these points and to proceed without having definitely studied these resources, implies running the risk of not utilizing appreciable forces which may suffice to decide the issue of a war in its first stages.

An army too large or inadequately equipped would make it necessary to be satisfied with an insufficient supply of ammunition, uniforms, equipment and food taking into consideration the country's available resources.

In both cases we would be facing a disastrous distribution of force which would result in inferiority, thereby evidencing our incapacity.

In the latter case, we would also have restricted the army operations by limiting its freedom of action, compelling it to be inactive as in the example previously mentioned of four rounds per day of the "75" cannon per Army corps; such a situation would be intolerable should it last for some time.

The organism to be created must be highly efficient and must possess the maximum freedom of action. No matter whether it is small or large, its function must be harmonious and well balanced.

If this is not done, an error might be made which would prove fatal.

As a logical result of such a method, the basis upon which to establish war plans would be immediately reached; next, the fundamental characteristic of the equipment, the organization and regulations would be defined as the expression of the tactical method most in accordance with the actual general situation of this country.

1. Passage from Peace strength to war strength

Military Mobilization: To complete the army in agreement with organization plans.

Industrial Mobilization: To complete the equipment by means of manufacturing during military mobilization and concentration.

2. Maintaining war strength

Industrial mobilization: Replacement of material expenditures (waste)
Efficiency Factors:

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The General Staff must decide from its study of the different hypotheses, what the probabilities would be for us in order to make preparations, inasmuch as conditions vary greatly under the various circumstances. The problem is a difficult one because we have had no war experience.

The Argentine is not in the situation of the European countries, but there is evident need of a complete plan of national defense because its existence and execution will constitute a greater degree of security and will insure peace. This plan requires a policy which should be advocated without exaggeration where the army or the navy are concerned; without encouraging a race in armament or developing an aggressive spirit.

The Argentine possesses powerful resources, but it cannot be said up to what point they are at our immediate disposal. It is not a case of buying tons of raw material in order to build up a reserve of military stocks, nor is it a case of fictitiously creating our own military industry.

The greatest cooperation on the part of the authorities should be established and the well meaning contribution of the most prominent representatives of the live forces of the country should be obtained.

World Production of Tungsten (Tons)

Countries	1911	1915	1917	1918	1919	1923
France	171	126	261	212	33	
Portugal	980	933	1,596	1,300	834	530
China			1,360	10,200	6,000	
Japan	250	440	1,660	1,700	850	250
Rumania	1,020	2,880	4,200	4,800	3,800	1,500
United States	1,035	2,120	5,574	4,573	845	220
Argentina	620	170	990	625	375	
Bolivia	336	850	4,215	3,700	2,160	
Other countries	2,461	3,905	5,457	5,362	4,068	637
TOTALS	6,873	11,424	25,313	32,472	18,965	7,637

Price in Argentina in 1933 per ton \$1,500 m/n or \$625 US Cy.
1934 " " \$2,500 m/n or \$1,042 US Cy.

60 - 80% must be added to the price for duties.

Scheelite per ton \$200 m/n or \$83 US Cy. in 1911.
\$2400 m/n or \$1000 US Cy. in 1915.
\$13000 m/n or \$5416 US Cy. in 1917.
\$600 m/n or \$249 US Cy. in 1923.

(A) Raw Materials

1. Natural resources and imported articles.
2. Normal consumption.
3. Replacements for the armed forces.
4. Development of natural resources.
5. Reduction of natural and normal consumption.
 - Reduction to essentials.
 - Replacement by use of substitutes.

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- 6. Reserves which may be stocked.
Before and during mobilization.
After mobilization - Restraining superfluous wastes.

(B) Manufacture

- 1. Motive power - its origin (special machines)
- 2. Machinery - factories and shops (transformable machinery
(adaptable ")
- 3. Labor - technical direction)
qualified labor) Argentine citizens living in neighboring
unqualified ") and other countries.

(C) Transportation

- Means of communication - air, water, inland and land
- 1. Methods of transport.
- 2. Important work.

The fundamental problem created by a war, from the material point of view, may be summarized as follows:

(A) RAW MATERIAL

- 1. Actual national resources and supplies obtained abroad.
- 2. Normal consumption: Destination and use.
- 3. Consumption required by military forces.
- 4. Manner of increasing local resources.
- 5. Manner of reducing normal consumption: Reduction to indispensable limits - Replacement by substitutes.
- 6. Stocks which may be manufactured (Before mobilization by means of legislation.
(Upon mobilization by restricting (superfluous expenditures.

(B) PRODUCTION

- 1. Electric power - origin of power (specialized)
- 2. Machinery (factories and shops) (transformable or
a) Technical direction (adaptable
- 3. Labor: (Argentines)
b) Qualification (neighboring countries)
c) No-qualification (from other countries)

(C) TRANSPORTATION

- 1. Means of communication: aerial, maritime, fluvial, land
a) Means of transport
b) Important works

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A general industrial mobilization has been decreed: (See report No. 5323 index
6600-d)

1) To effect a general and industrial census as soon as possible. A census of this nature compensates for the expenses entailed on account of the information it furnishes and which makes it possible to appreciate the country's progress scientifically and not thaumaturgically.

2) To legislate in accordance with the desired orientation. In estimating the value and the relative importance of each industry, the policy of national defense must be to develop and stimulate some, and promote others. It will provide subsidies for such indispensable industries as cannot be established with private capital and will encourage the legal formation of stocks of important raw material and the adoption of substitutes. It will contemplate the possibility of creating new industrial regions or zones, thus

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relieving the Federal Capital. It will consider interests connected with all public works, especially roads, bridges, hydraulic works and power stations.

An interesting point of governmental action is the creation and development of the arts and crafts, as well as industrial schools and, furthermore, the utilization of engineers and chemists in substitution for routine practices which now cause energies to be wasted.

The nation should first of all seek to obtain its own technical experts and, in order to achieve this, it must encourage their preparation by requiring their services as much as possible.

Such a policy demands coordination; otherwise each ministry or department works separately, making the same experiments and discoveries repeatedly, without ever going beyond the preliminary stage.

To carry out this task, it is necessary to have a Council of National Defense formed by the members of the Executive Power, inasmuch as the plan of national defense is, in substance, an aspect of the policy followed by the Government in such matters.

Furthermore, a National Defense Committee is required - a technical organization formed by prominent representatives of all the country's activities to centralize work and propose the procedure to be applied in each separate case.

To enable us to outline the formation of the Council and that of the National Defense Committee, it must be pointed out the means at their disposal for carrying out the policy.

Considering fuels: Coal, petroleum, wood - Quantities consumed and their origin.

The nations cannot do without fuel. It would be war contraband.
Uses:

- a) Railway and river transports.
- b) Indispensable domestic uses such as gas for cooking and direct combustion.
- c) Central power plants. Factories, Electric power for plants.

The power used in the industrial zone of Buenos Aires and its suburbs within 60 kilometres, is supplied almost exclusively by the C H A D E and the Italo-Argentine Plants, and 90% thereof is obtained from the use of coal as fuel.

Out of 1,550,000 KWH produced in the country, 70% is produced by Buenos Aires, 63% of which is produced by C H A D E. Should C H A D E not be able to import coal, almost 60% of the Argentine plants would be paralyzed before the use of another kind of fuel could be substituted. The above indicates the military importance of the C H A D E power plant.

For the coal imported see table showing the relation between the imported tonnage and the total volume of foreign imports.

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COAL

Relation between the total tonnage of coal imported and the total tonnage consumed.

1913 -	4,046,000 tons	1910 - 40%
1917 -	708,000 "	1915 - 49%
1929 -	3,135,000 "	1920 - 37%
1930 -	3,061,000 "	1925 - 31%
1931 -	2,619,000 "	1930 - 25%
1932 -	2,387,000 "	1932 - 34%

With reference to coal reserves, even though it may be difficult to stimulate the formation by civilian enterprises (railways, gas companies, petroleum distilleries) it will be necessary to find a way to increase their respective stocks and to provide for eventual interruptions in their supplies.

Considering petroleum and its by-products, the national situation is improving day by day.

It was only in 1929 that Argentine production succeeded in equalling the imported tonnage of 1,800,000 of which 425,000 was gasoline.

Will Argentina continue to import from abroad the quantity of which direct use is made or that is transformed into gasoline? From what countries can it be secured?

Is it possible to intensify the exploitation of petroleum? What is the deficit in that of other fuels that must be covered with petroleum?

Is it advisable to encourage the use of gasoline mixing it with other products such as alcohol? This nation can become a great producer of alcohol.

What are the reserve zones which it will be well to develop in case of war and the estimate of their value?

In what proportion will petroleum be distributed between the Army, Navy, Railways, Agriculture, Navigation, motor transportation, factories, shops and plants? The technical part of this study will devolve upon the National Defense Committee, the requirements and the analysis on one hand, and resources on the other. This might be further developed to consider the reserves entrusted to the Government-owned oil-fields, the system of development and measures of security.

Once that the National Defense Committee is in possession of all the information which may be obtained as the result of its technical studies, it will become necessary for the executive power to dictate the policy which will take into consideration all the different factors, which we will call the national defense policy.


INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION - PRINCIPAL WORK - ORGANIZATION

During the first period immediately following the declaration of war, which, the General Staff estimates to be of long duration, and prior to the beginning of joint operations, it will be necessary for the industrial mobilized concerns to commence the production of all classes of equipment, since our state of preparation demands such a course of action.

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The following table gives an idea of the origin of the said equipment (organization).



In accordance with the foregoing, the order in which the mobilization should be organized is as follows:

- 1) Determination of the industrial capacity without reference to the production of war material. This may be accomplished by means of complementary investigation during the industrial census and from other reliable sources of information.
- 2) Comparison of the material requirements of the Army, Navy and Aviation as estimated by their respective staffs with the possibilities of the Argentine industry which is calculated to face such requirements.
- 3) The furtherance of the investigation of all resources, for which there already exists methods originated by the organization in charge of the preparation of the industrial mobilization; define the productive capacity of the country.
- 4) To investigate through further study the material requirements of the military forces and to furnish details of such requirements to the companies concerned.
- 5) Preparation of plans for the production of all material, beginning with the most important.
- 6) Distribution of labor and factories, that is, the planning of industrial mobilization.


In order to carry out the work mentioned above, it is necessary to begin by subdividing the country into industrial regions.

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An estimate is that shown in the following drawing. It is in accord with the political and military divisions, with slight exceptions.

The important zone of the Federal Capital cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of the 2nd Region, since, from a manufacturing point of view, it forms a solid block with the Capital itself; for this reason, it is not advisable to place it under two authorities. In effect, these two regions possess sources of energy for motive power; the same source of raw materials; besides the daily displacement of labor from one jurisdiction to another and other factors in common which unite them.



The industrial districts are not considered with relation to the political division on account of the fact that in the opinion of the General Staff the industrial districts are adjusted to the flow of raw materials, to the supply of power and labor. The exception is found in Comodoro Rivadavia and its contingent zone as well as in Entre Ríos.

The industrial districts have no point of contact with military districts, because it is believed that there should not exist incompatibility between them and that the differentiation of the work is in keeping with the principles of the scientific organization of labor.

Each proposed district has an important industry centered therein - arsenals, railway shops, factories, plants, important storage areas, foundries, etc.

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ORGANIZATION

The organization of the work pertaining to industrial mobilization is incumbent on the chief of the Technical division of the Ordnance Department (2nd Division), who receives orders directly from the President of the National Defense Committee. The regulations in force stipulate that these activities come under the said Direccion General.

It is not advisable to create a special division because of the fact that there would be a prejudicial duplicity; the solution is therefore to supply the Direccion General with adequate personnel and specialized technical experts. No subdivision can be made of the studies and work of the Technical Divisions.

The Divisions of Army and Navy Material would be non-effective if industrial mobilization and its influences were not taken into consideration. To not consider this would be to grant that in time of peace the Army can use, for its instruction, better and different material than that which it would be supplied with during war.

The following are the principal duties entrusted to the Chief of the Sub-Commission of Industrial Mobilization:

- 1) To maintain close contact with the General Staff of the Army and the Navy from which will be received ideas for the execution of this mission, adjusting by mutual agreement the reciprocal requirements and conditions.
- 2) To consider, both separately and as a whole, the Mobilization Plans prepared by the War and Navy Departments.
- 3) To investigate the different projects and plans of mobilization in order to obtain the corresponding material.
- 4) To take part in all the experiments, modifications, acquisitions or adaptations with reference to Army and Navy Material.

At first it might seem as though this system involves an arbitrary subjection of the studies made by perfectly competent organizations to an extemporaneous body which might fundamentally change the ideas or basis which was the original idea. The latter might propose a substantial modification of the material which has been considered and, in so doing, would be sufficient to prove the logic of its theory.

In this respect, an effort must be made to facilitate the replacement of certain elements without detracting from their efficiency, or to simplify the supply of ammunition and to indicate the substitutes already known or used, or to advise the adoption of other slightly different raw material already utilized in other elements.

- 5) To estimate the technical capacity of industrial establishments and to classify them according to their specialty and condition, subdividing them into:
 - a) Factories, which, upon mobilization must be totally under the military system, assigning to them special production on a large scale or using them as centers for the extension of specialized shops. (In this case, the owners of such factories being dislodged, it would be necessary to purchase the establishments since they would no longer be allowed freedom of trade.)

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b) Factories of first classification capable of being provisionally or totally mobilized for the purpose of producing war material, but retaining their commercial independence as well as their executive technical personnel.

c) Factories of military utility of second classification capable of being temporarily mobilized, considered as reserves of the former.

In consideration of the previous points, it is possible to estimate the quantity and the character of the new factories to be built during the period of mobilization.

6) To fix quotas for raw material, power, means of production and to regulate the distribution of labor among the different factories for all the departments and for the country.

7) To prepare the laws and regulations to be dictated in case of secret mobilization, partial or general, with regard to raw material and the administration system:

a) Concrete definition of those of interest.

b) Compulsory declaration of stocks of all kinds, not failing to remember the possible combinations with other products easily reduced.

c) Requisition centers and respective orders. Quantities and manner of applying measures.

d) Prohibitions regarding exportation.

e) Proposals concerning taxation and liberation of duties.

8) To estimate the personnel that can be mobilized and must remain in the factories upon military mobilization.

9) To organize and direct the studies or works in order to obtain an approximate estimate of the war power and the analysis of the degree of material preparation of the neighboring countries by army officers or secret agents especially appointed on regular or secret missions and by means of ordinary information within reach.

The following divisions are made in connection with the fulfilment of this program:

Drawing up of Plans to determine in detail the quantity required of each class of material, from the simplest to the most complex, - raw material, electric power, machinery, class of labor and time required for execution.

Mobilization Plans coordinating the use of all the factories and the country's resources.

In case of war the Technical Division of the Ordnance Department becomes the Dirección Técnica de las Fabricaciones de Materiales de Guerra and is called upon to submit to the respective Minister all the executive operations pertaining to mobilization, to carry out with a spirit of coordination in keeping with the real situation, the plans of industrial mobilization, the plans for the purchase of material (prepared by the corresponding divisions), and lastly, to submit the plans for approval to the Ministry. It is equivalent to the technical office of a great enterprise made up of all the factories of the country engaged in producing war material.

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The Technical Director of Manufacturing strictly administers the raw materials, especially fuel, and is technically responsible for the use made of stocks. He determines the chronological order of production in accordance with the urgency of orders.

Industrial inspectors, whose functions are executive, are appointed immediately upon mobilization being ordered and are in charge of the total supervision of production, its control with regard to quantity and quality, and in general, the compliance with orders for production. These inspectors exercise authority over labor as well as salaries, wages, lodgings, and hygiene. They will employ specially appointed personnel of the industrial districts.

During time of peace Sub-Commissions of the industrial districts will prepare the mobilization plans for all the factories within their jurisdictions and that during time of war will take charge of the general supervisions of production, for which purpose they will be assisted by the engineers and technical experts assigned to them.

MILITARY REGIME

The preparation of plans will be incumbent on naval and military officials who will coordinate and maintain close contact with the industrialists; they will have to be called upon to assist in the settlement of innumerable problems which may arise and which may only be solved in the experimental field of the shops.

Production will ordinarily correspond to military necessities; therefore, the army will control its reception, but the production engineers in the factories must have complete liberty to elect the procedure and the means to accomplish their tasks. It must be borne in mind that in order to take charge of all the factories representing many millions of dollars, the State must be made responsible for all the machinery and property therein and must guarantee to the owners a reasonable rate of interest for their investment. No one can direct a factory better than its own engineers and proprietors. It would be next to impossible for the State to take charge of all the factories. Who would it place at the head of them?

Argentina already lacks first line combat officers. It would not be advisable therefore to remove the executive and specialists personnel which have been provided for in the military mobilization plans.

Military control must be applied to labor (including engineers, chiefs of sections and foremen), working hours and the numbers of shifts as well as the establishment of penalties in cases where the yield should be intentionally reduced. Furthermore, the control of production (quantity within fixed time limits and quality) must be very strict. Prices must be studied in order to avoid excessive profits, and control must be exercised to the scale of wages in accordance with the indexes and the cost of living in the various regions.

FACTORS OF INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION

The preparatory work to which reference has been made, requires considerable time for its completion. To reduce the time required and in order to maintain the information in an up-to-date form it will be necessary to thoroughly organize the work of investigation entrusted to naval, military

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and civil experts, under a common directive, and above all, it will be necessary to interest private industries in this matter.

With regard to production, military and civil, it will be advisable to obtain it by the policy mentioned above. The interest corresponding to the capital invested, may be developed in accordance with farsighted provisions based on our own reserves, and in keeping with the modern methods of labor.

To summarize the most important factors which would have a positive bearing on the national industrial situation, which would favor industrial mobilization and which will logically be adopted in case of war:

1) FAITH IN NATIONAL INDUSTRIES AND TECHNICAL EXPERTS:

The factor "faith" in the Argentine industries which must be given prominence due to its being a vital point in the national preparedness and especially in order to lessen the impression that the authorities are exaggerating the importance of material factors.

Our industrial mechanical capacity has developed within the last few years under favorable conditions brought about by the world situation.

The manufacture of articles from foreign raw materials was initiated owing to the low price of labor. The importation of manufactured products has decreased in large proportions. The fact that scientific labor processes or at least more modern methods have not yet been applied is because there is no competition among manufacturers, and particularly on account of the fact that the Argentine market is not large enough to justify production on a large scale. In this connection it is pointed out that the requirements of neighboring countries have been added to that of the Argentine.

With regard to articles exported on a large scale, such as containers, motor accessories for trucks, automobiles and other machinery, simple but requiring precision, the Argentine has passed the first stage and now produces such articles, if not in large quantities, at least of excellent quality, exactitude and at relative cost.

Several factories have developed their constructive programs in a very satisfactory manner, and these are directed by highly efficient Argentine professionals. These establishments compare favorable with others that are directed by foreign engineers employed for reasons connected with the investment of capital.

SCIENTIFIC ORGANIZATION OF LABOR

With the exception of about ten important factories and shops, the operation of the other industrial establishments is conducted with totally inadequate methods. These are not old-fashioned because that might give the impression that they are undergoing a period of evolution which is not the case.

If it ever becomes necessary to favor an establishment for the sole purpose of encouraging it or assisting it in solving some problem, it is first necessary to find out whether it works merely by intuition.

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Such factories do not pay attention to time, for to them one or two hours more or less makes no difference.

This is indicative of ignorance. It is a fact that while one factory may make use of the Denis-Payet system and while it employs eleven civil and industrial engineers with a personnel of about 1000 men and spends money in books and magazines for the use of its technical personnel, there are others that employ double that figure, with three times as much machinery, etc... but do not employ any engineers nor make use of rules and estimates.

The production of war material can only be effected by fulfilling such requisites of excellent preparation and intensive yield in series.

In short, production must answer the following conditions:

a) Precision; (Manufacturers' tolerances) Verification and Control

Production in large series is only possible if the interchangeability of all the pieces is insured. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to establish tolerancias in keeping with the kind of work to which each part will be submitted.

b) Normalization or standardization

c) Manufacturing

The manufacturing plan is a most important group of documents and comprises all the plans which give precise details of each operation, indicating the machinery to be used as well as the labor conditions to be encountered.

The final drawing up of these plans with reference to the manufacture of war material is a final step towards industrial mobilization and of great importance to the military and naval authorities.

In order that such plans may receive practical approval of the factories, it is necessary for the military authorities to entrust civilian concerns with the production of all such articles as they may be able to produce; all, without exception. In this respect, it may be necessary to proceed slowly owing to other conditions which may arise, although these may not be of an industrial nature.

Should it be necessary in Argentina for the arsenals to produce machine-guns, spare parts, gunpowder and ammunition, it is on account of the fact that this material cannot be produced by private enterprises inasmuch as the latter do not constitute independent industries or subsidiaries of other larger concerns which produce mechanisms or products, as is the case in Europe with the great majority of the armament and munitions factories.

The General Staff considers that the Ordnance Department must have exclusive charge of production on account of the fact that it is necessary to insure the provision of material, and economically, because the necessary installations are extremely costly; commercially, these installations do not succeed in covering interest and amortization.

The most important considerations in the preparation of military establishments and in which economies must not be made are as follows:

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- 1) The preparation of plans for manufacture.
- 2) The testing of the different models.
- 3) The definition of the principal characteristics of each material required.

Within the field of experiment, trials, and with the adoption of the newest methods and installations, military arsenals must initiate their application to prove their utility or efficacy or to show up their defects. This applies in the case of some large steel companies which are desirous of installing army and naval arsenals.

The adoption of military arsenals constitutes an unsuspected and extraordinary progress, for although they already exist in the country, their installation will prove the possibility of carrying out works of great utility representing great technical improvements. It will materially increase our war power, and will mark a new phase in the industrial evolution of the country.


CREATION OF NEW INDUSTRIAL ZONES AND ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE EXPLOITATION OF OUR OWN RAW MATERIAL AND THE INSTALLATION OF HYDROELECTRICAL PLANTS

These topics have already been dealt with but it is well to point out that, from the military point of view, an endeavor should be made to spread out the accumulation of factories and power plants, because such a situation may endanger national security. New industrial zones should be created and then to assign as centers, such shops, factories or military establishments as may answer the characteristics mentioned above.

STATISTICAL INFORMATION

It is indispensable to formulate a nomenclature with a view to classifying all the industrial establishments and their activities; otherwise it will never be possible to obtain data in a logical and useful manner. For the drawing up of such information official designations should be followed provided that they agree with those used in the most reliable technical handbooks; those that are antiquated or not scientific enough, should be modified.

Source: Personal Contact



Frederick D. Sharp
Capt., G.S.,
Military Attaché.

From M.A. Argentina

Report No. 5316

March 9, 1936.

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ARGENTINE INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL
DEVELOPMENT TO BE ATTACHED AS SUPPLEMENT TO
INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION

1935 proved to be an eventful and certainly a progressive year for Argentina. In practically all departments of agriculture and pastoral activity, in local industry, in foreign trade, and in finance, material progress was recorded - progress not only in the sense of more stable and more normal conditions, but in some respects developments were of a much needed character which had not been recognized or effected before. The result of the year's operations was so generally beneficial and encouraging that it is believed that Argentina, in comparison with other countries of the world, ranks very near the top, and among the leaders of those countries which have managed to effect a rehabilitation of internal and external affairs, approaching conditions which existed before the depression.

On the whole, agricultural conditions were good, despite the drought which occurred during the months of August, September, and October. Grain Exports throughout the year were higher in value, due largely to the international situation, but the lower supplies which are in prospect for the 1936 season have caused the Government to increase basic guaranteed prices for both wheat and linseed, and while the situation appears to be healthy for the moment, it is feared that such values will encourage farmers to greatly expand planting for the 1937 season, which will result in quantities quite beyond the capacity of the Government to handle on its present basis. The same situation applies to the corn crop, the 1935 guaranteed price holding at 4.40 pesos per 100 kilos. The new 1936 crop is without doubt going to be of true bumper proportions, ranging from 16,000,000 to 18,000,000 tons. Ordinarily Europe takes from this country approximately 8,000,000 tons each year, although during 1935 these exports amounted to only 6,000,000 tons. The United States was an important buyer during 1935, but there is no assurance that her buying will continue during the new year, and the problem of disposing of an exportable surplus of approximately 12,000,000 tons of corn is almost baffling. No doubt growers will insist and bring pressure to bear upon the Government to guarantee a price. If this is done, the chances are that the price will be above the international level. The difference would of course be paid by the Government, presumably out of the exchange fund.

Industry during 1935 made rapid strides in productive activity, in the improvement of its products, and it was only toward the end of the year that trouble with labor developed. Generally speaking, the materialization of labor difficulties is taken as a good sign, and upon this basis, and considering the prospects of the country for the new year, there may be further labor troubles. Without doubt domestic manufacturers have during the past several years made considerable money, as their market has been very largely protected by high import duties and exchange taxes on imports. On the other hand, only a very small proportion of these increased earnings have been passed along to labor, and unless operators take it upon themselves to better the condition of their workmen, labor trouble may become quite widespread throughout the country.

The Commercial position gives a very encouraging picture for 1936. The last year's drought has somewhat prejudiced conditions throughout rural territories, but on the other hand prices have been increased, and the returns for crops are averaging generally fair. The rains which have fallen during the past two months have resulted in excellent planting conditions, and many reports indicated that the linseed and wheat, last season's two conspicuous failures, will be planted in April, May, and June, with prospects for good crops

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very promising.

While Argentina's foreign trade for the year just closed reached a new high favorable balance for the past few annual periods, there is some question regarding the developments of 1936, but this depends to a large extent upon export values, and it is predicted that the record for the new year will compare very favorably with that for 1935. Any loss in quantity which may occur will probably be made up in increased values; that is, with the exception of corn, and happily Argentina is not dependent upon this crop, although it has during recent years become a major export commodity.

The Government has worked steadily toward the realization of commercial understandings and trade agreements, actual accomplishments including treaties with Finland and Uruguay, a preliminary understanding with Brazil and the renewal of the German trade treaty. Both Italian and French missions have visited Argentina with a view to studying conditions and arriving at a basis for the consummation of trade agreements, and it is expected that definite conclusions of these conventions will take place during the new year. In the meantime, Argentina's most important mark during 1936 is the renewal of the Runciman-Roca agreements in November. It now appears that Argentina must face the probability of an import duty on chilled and frozen meat shipped from this country to England, and while the actual duty is of no material consequence, it does indicate the fact that competition from British Dominions is becoming more severe. Undoubtedly, other demands will be made upon Argentina such as a relaxation of exchange conditions covering the transmittal of funds in the form of dividends and amortization upon British capital invested in this country. It is reported that preliminary conversations are already under way, and it is expected that from now until November the Argentine Government, particularly the Departments of Finance and Agriculture, will largely devote their time to these negotiations.

COTTON. - The Argentine Government has particularly identified itself with the encouragement of cotton cultivation in this country. This encouragement has taken the form of the distribution of selected seeds, making loans available to prospective cotton farmers, the creation of a national cotton board, the latter in turn being responsible for the establishment of six standard grades, ranging from "A" to "F", which are in many ways comparable to the American standards. The 1933-34 production of cotton amounted to 155,236 tons of raw fiber, which after ginning resulted in 43,357 tons of cotton fiber and 106,833 tons of cotton-seed. Production during the 1934-35 season was 238,285 tons of raw cotton, or 64,038 tons of cotton fiber and 164,187 tons of cottonseed.

The Chaco territory has definitely established itself as Argentina's leading cotton producing area, but appreciable quantities are also grown in Corrientes, Santiago del Estero, Formosa, and Santa Fe. Total plantings for the entire country for 1932-1933 amounted to 342,095 acres, for the following year this aggregate had increased to 481,650 acres, in 1934-1935 the area was 706,783 acres, and the current estimate of the 1935-1936 planting is 908,960 acres. On the basis of the 1934-1935 returns per acre, it would appear that cotton fiber and cottonseed production for the present season will be considerably in excess of that for last season.

It is estimated that cotton exports from Argentina during 1935 totaled 36,329 metric tons valued at 27,479,000 pesos, as compared with 27,112 tons and a value of 20,417,000 pesos for the previous year. Argentina's most important markets so far have been Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and France, although Japan took several shipments during the latter part of the year.

From M.A. Argentina

Report No. 338*

March 17, 1936.

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SUGAR. - Sugar production for the season just closed, that is the period commonly referred to as 1935-1936, increased appreciably over that for the previous season. The area harvested for the 1935-1936 season was 362,048 acres of cane. Milling activities for the 1935-1936 season consumed 9,623,675,000 lbs. of cane, as against 8,050,680,000 lbs. for the previous season. Production during the 1935-1936 season was 848,159,492 lbs. of sugar as against 751,951,200 lbs. for the season 1934-1935.

RICE. - Rice production for the 1934-1935 season established a record, the total return being 34,916 metric tons as compared with 33,510 tons for the previous season. The area planted for the 1934-1935 crop was 38,137 acres, and while this area was lower than that for the 1933-1934 season, the production was considerably higher per acre.

Tucuman is Argentina's leading provincial rice growing area, although important quantities are also planted and harvested in Salta, Misiones, Corrientes, and Entre Rios. The Government is being of material assistance in the encouragement of rice growing, but the area where its cultivation can be effectively carried out is somewhat limited, and imports, particularly from Brazil, will probably continue. Total imports during 1934 were 926,078 bags while for 1935 this aggregate increased to 1,095,846 bags.

FRESH FRUITS. - This country is consistently and rapidly establishing itself as a producer of citrus and deciduous fruits of all types, and during the past year, in addition to fairly thoroughly controlling the domestic market, Argentina has found it necessary to establish trade connections for the distribution of her deciduous fruits in the United States and in Europe.

During 1935 there were exported from Argentina 37,913,000 pounds of fruits. This aggregate in boxes or crates amounted to 1,217,576 units. Grapes were by far the most important single item, pears ranked second, apples third, and peaches fourth. However, melons, grapefruit, and plums, are other fruits which hold promise, and it is believed that before many years the Argentine industry, particularly that section in the Rio Negro area, will become an important factor in the export fruit trade. Growers are apparently well aware of the requirements of export markets, and it is significant that the Government itself has attempted to establish standard grades and requirements, and it is only by meeting these conditions that exports are allowed.

PACKING HOUSE TRADE. - Throughout the Argentine, the local frigorificos were operating at a fair level of capacity, and with the exception of the months of August, September, and October, when the drought was reflected in the condition of the cattle, animals were plentiful, and on an average in from fair to good condition. Prices did not change materially, although the creation of the Government's Junta Nacional de Carnes, and the inauguration of the Government backed "corporacion" tended to somewhat raise cattle values.

During the year just closed the frigorificos slaughtered 2,645,192 head of cattle, an increase of 42,758 head, as compared with 1934. 4,243,252 head of sheep, an improvement of 236,000 over 1934, were slaughtered, while 913,545 head of hogs were slaughtered, an increase of 3,234 animals against the previous year. The Liniers municipal slaughter-house accounted for 1,078,553 head of cattle, 834,288 head of sheep, and 260,134 head of hogs during 1935.

MUTTON AND LAMB. - The supply of sheep and lambs during the year was considered plentiful, excepting during the drought period of August, September, and October. With the opening of the year the average price was 67, this quotation

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advanced to \$1 during September, which directly reflects the influence of the drought by the scarcity of good conditioned animals; while at the close of the year the price had again dropped back to 62.

ANIMAL BY-PRODUCTS. - Export shipments of by-products were materially higher in 1935 as compared with 1934. The quantity increased from 176,002 tons to 205,349 tons, while the respective total values were 37,490,621 pesos and 49,438,522 pesos. Under this general heading there were appreciable improvements in the shipments of stearin, hog fat, refined fat, cracklings, and bones, while on the other hand exports of refined tallow fell off by 33.1/3%.

HAIR. - The export trade in hair for 1935 does not compare favorably with that for the preceding year. As a matter of fact, exports fell to 3,019 tons from 3,975 tons during 1934, while the value figures were 4,387,068 pesos and 5,173,643 pesos.

HIDES. - Quite a satisfactory year was recorded by dealers in hides and skins, not only insofar as local consumption was concerned, but particularly as regards export demand. Estimates place the total number of cattle hides exported during 1935 at 7,829,440, an increase of approximately 700,000 hides as compared with the 1934 total which was 7,110,771. Exports of sheepskins were up to 40,504 bales against 34,452 bales for 1934; goatskins increased to 5,524 bales as compared with 4,055 bales for the previous year; kidskins were higher at 447 bales than the 1934 total of 391 bales; while horseshides alone decreased, although by a comparatively unimportant quantity, to 249,350 hides during 1935 as compared with 259,524 hides during 1934.

Shipments of salted hides were higher for 1935 than during the previous year, while shipments of dried hides were approximately the same. For the year just closed the United States ranked as Argentina's most important consumer of salted hides, taking 1,517,277 in number, this aggregate even exceeding that which went to Germany, which stood at 1,365,226 hides. Other important markets were the Scandinavian countries, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Czecho-Slovakia, the Netherlands, and Italy. Germany was the chief buyer of dried hides, Italy ranked as the second most important market, the United Kingdom third, Spain fourth, and Czecho-Slovakia fifth.

Exports of both salted and dried calf skins were improved as compared with 1934. While Germany ranked as the most important buyer of salted calf skins, her 1935 total was reduced by approximately 20% as compared with 1934. On the other hand, appreciable increases were shown in shipments made to the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

The United States was the ranking importer of dried calf skins from Argentina during 1935, shipments from this country to that destination having increased from 8,603 to 130,030 skins. Czecho-Slovakia also showed increased buying, while that from Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain fell off under this heading.

WOOL. - Argentina's wool production for the 1933-1934 season, that is, from October 1, 1933 to September 30, 1934, was 158,000 metric tons. The production for 1934-1935 was 166,000 metric tons, while the estimated production for the current 1935-1936 season is calculated to be in the neighborhood of 142,000 metric tons. This reduced wool production is due to a number of causes, partially to the sheep census which now places the probable number

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of animals in the country at approximately 38,000,000 head, as compared with 44,500,000 during 1930-1931. However, other adverse features during the latter part of 1935, the threatened drought and bad weather, are factors which influence the supposition that the wool production which is just now coming on to the market will be considerably lower than it has been for some years.

INDUSTRY

Industrial development in Argentina has been gaining momentum for some years past, and during 1935 there were many new evidences of growth, such as the creation of new factories or the enlargement of existing plants which are devoted to the manufacturing of goods previously imported from overseas. This trend toward economic self-sufficiency has been particularly noticeable recently, and it is thought that in line with decreased imports from overseas which are now being supplied by local enterprises, the employment of Argentine labor has improved by a marked degree. In 1931 it is estimated that there were approximately 30,000 Argentine workmen engaged in the manufacture and the production of materials and commodities previously imported from overseas. By the following year this total had increased to 70,000; by 1933 the aggregate was 100,000; and at the close 1934 the total was 120,000. It seems reasonable to suppose that at the end of last year the number of these employees had probably increased to between 140,000 and 150,000.

On the whole, internal trade throughout Argentina during 1935 improved materially over that of the preceding several years. More money was available to agriculturists, as well as urban and city dwellers, and this condition was almost immediately reflected by heavier purchases of staple as well as luxury prices, which has become a Governmental objective in many countries throughout the world, was quite noticeable in Argentina, where wholesale prices for the year improved in all categories in agricultural and pastoral products.

BASIC INDUSTRIES

Argentina's most important industries may be classed as basic industries, in the sense that they are dependent upon the agricultural and pastoral character of the country. This generalization includes for instance sugar milling, the manufacture of quebracho extract, the dairy industry, rice milling, the manufacture of vegetable oils, and wines.

SUGAR INDUSTRY. - The total sugar produced during the 1935 season was 848,159,492 lbs. as compared with 751,951,200 lbs., during 1934. The 1935 production consisted of 386,811,000 lbs. of lump or refined sugar, 442,600,000 lbs. of granulated sugar, and 18,748,000 lbs. of crude sugar and by-products.

The area harvested during the 1935 season was 353,048 acres, and the quantity of cane milled was 9,623,675,000 lbs. as against 8,050,680,000 lbs. of cane during 1934. The Province of Tucuman continues to be the leading producing area, with Jujuy, Salta, the Chaco, Santa Fe, and Corrientes materially supplementing the Tucuman production.

QUEBRACHO. - The quebracho industry during the year was in a somewhat anomalous position, in the sense that its production and foreign sales came under the direction of what is known as the Quebracho Control Committee. The organization, which consists of practically all producers in Argentina, undertook to restrict production, and confine foreign marketing sales channels to

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recognized agencies, with the express purpose of not only placing the local industry on a firm economic foundation, but also eliminating certain marketing practices which had heretofore been productive of unhealthy competition and speculation.

The Committee set a projected export total of 250,000 tons of extract for the year 1935, and while records show that exports amounted only to 224,000 tons, it is reported that sales for delivery actually brought the 1935 aggregate up to 260,000 tons. A standard export price of £ 15/-/- C.I.F. Hamburg, Germany per metric ton was established for all shipments out of the country, and the Government's records indicate that while the 1934 average per ton value of quebracho extract was 153,10 pesos, this had by the end of 1935 increased by 26.8%, to 215.90 pesos per ton.

Export of quebracho logs during 1935 amounted to slightly over 108,000 tons, as against 117,000 tons for the previous year. The feature in this trade for the period under discussion was the creation, by the Government, of a regulation prohibiting the exportation of any logs which do not comply with the conditions specifying the characteristics of what is known as an "export type" log - a log of first quality without defects, blemishes, or disease. One reason for these restrictions being placed upon the logs was to prevent the exportation of inferior primary materials, and secondly, and of much more importance, is the desire of the Government as well as the Extract Control Committee, to discourage the exportation of any raw material and encourage the manufacture of all quebracho products within the Argentine itself. This does not mean, of course, that exportation of logs is prohibited. Good logs are obtainable at a price, but it is believed that consumers of quebracho extract will in the future probably find it more to their advantage to buy the extract which has been produced in Argentina, rather than attempt to purchase logs and do this manufacturing themselves.

DAIRY INDUSTRY. - The dairy industry did not enjoy a very favorable or successful year. Export markets were somewhat contracted, domestic sales were reported lower, and the drought which made itself particularly felt during August, September, and October, seriously influenced the condition of pasture; milk products fell off; and with increased prices sales were reduced.

It is estimated that the 1935 production of butter was 60,324,000 lbs. as compared with 68,572,000 lbs. for 1934. During those two periods domestic sales fell off to 45,368,000 lbs. as compared with 52,807,000 lbs., while exports were reduced to 14,483,000 lbs. as against 17,651,000 lbs. during 1934.

RICE INDUSTRY. - The most recent statistics available regarding the domestic rice milling industry cover the year 1934. During that period there were nine mills in operation, representing a capital investment of 7,294,000 pesos, employing 312 persons. The motive power of the industry during the year under consideration was 1,957 H.P.

The 1934 production of the Argentine mills consisted of 80,747,000 lbs. of polished rice, 21,498,000 lbs. of by-products, and 528,000 lbs. of subsidiary products. The value of the total production was 15,183,000 pesos, and the value of the prime materials consumed was 13,059,000 pesos. The prime materials consumed included 23,585,000 lbs. of domestically grown rice, and 103,365,000 lbs. of imported rice.

VEGETABLE OILS. - The production of vegetable oils in this country during the past few years has increased consistently, the 1934 total being 113,166,000 lbs., of which peanut oil accounted for 39,202,000 lbs., cottonseed oil 26,877,000

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lbs., and grapeseed oil 23,129,000 lbs. However, a distinct new departure has been noted in the manufacture of grapeseed oil, and it is also reported that the production of sunflower seed oil is increasing appreciably, as the sunflower oil has been found to be a very acceptable substitute for other vegetable cooking oils, particularly in view of the fact that it is much more stable in a mixture, and does not apparently have any tendency to cloud. Report from rural areas indicate that the planting of fields of sunflowers is expanding appreciably.

MISCELLANEOUS. - Among other domestic industries coming under this general heading may be included flour milling, which produced 1,415,000 metric tons of flour during the year 1934. The 1934 wine production for the country is estimated at 198,150,000 gallons, while the production for 1935 is reported to be somewhat lower. The yerba mate industry was largely involved during the year in the creation of regulations, although the actual growing of yerba mate has not assumed really important proportions, as most of this leaf, which is widely consumed in Argentina, is still imported from Brazil and Uruguay,

While no accurate figures are available, it is estimated that during the year 1934 some 1,098,133 hides were tanned locally, of which 758,588 were quebracho tanned, and 339,545 were chrome tanned. Production is gradually on the increase, but what is of even more importance, the quality of the locally manufactured leather is, according to reports, improving materially from year to year, and it is expected that within a comparatively short time Argentina will be relatively self-sufficient, insofar as her leather requirements are concerned.

PRIMARY INDUSTRIES

BAG MANUFACTURING. - Local requirements of cereal and grain sacks very largely are supplied by the domestic industry, which during the year 1935 produced 72,853,000 wheat sacks, 2,492,000 corn sacks, 12,506,000 sacks for other cereals, 18,044,000 bags for linseed, 23,000 "cubanas," 13,035,000 flour sacks, 5,937,000 potato sacks, 6,057,000 sugar sacks, 1,018,000 yerba sacks, and 9,675,000 sacks for other purposes.

BUILDING & CONSTRUCTION. - On the whole, building activity throughout the country was fairly active during the year just closed, and while statistics are available only for the municipal area of Buenos Aires, it is known that considerable reconstruction and new construction was undertaken in rural areas. In Buenos Aires itself the total number of building permits requested was 12,774 as compared with 13,704 during 1934. The comparable estimates of the value of the projected work was 113,994,000 pesos for last year and 126,480,000 pesos for the preceding year.

Most activity in the Capital area has been representative of comparatively large units, that is, either apartment house construction or the creation of industrial plants. To be sure, there have been a relatively large number of small or individual dwellings that have also been built, but the preponderance of value has certainly been with the larger units. At one time it was expected that the 1935 totals would be appreciably above those for 1934, but during the latter part of October a strike started in the building trade which rapidly spread, and within a comparatively short time embraced all workmen. Activity on most buildings was completely suspended, and it was only after protracted negotiations carried on over a period of more than two months that a settlement was finally concluded. Higher wages are now to be paid by contractors, it is understood that much work is in prospect, and very probably the new year will show totals higher than those recorded for 1934.

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CEMENT INDUSTRY. - It is estimated that approximately 4,388,000 barrels of cement were consumed in Argentina during the year 1935, of which the national manufacturers supplied 4,241,000 barrels, the balance of 147,000 barrels being imported. It is believed that the sales figures of the domestic manufacture are closely comparable to production statistics, and that the five Argentine mills produced at least 95% of the amount that was shipped, that is, very little stock was carried over from 1934.

GAS & ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION. - The production of electricity throughout the country has steadily increased during the past few years. During 1932 the total was estimated at 1,549,800,000 kilowatt hours, for 1933 this aggregate had increased to 1,623,300,000 kilowatt hours, and for 1934 to 1,732,300,000 kilowatt hours.

The only general data which is available regarding gas production is that supplied by the Cia. Primitiva do Gas de Buenos Aires, Ltda. This organization reports that during the year 1935 it produced 2,571,262,133 cubic foot, of which 2,494,672,597 cubic feet were sold. The number of gas meters installed as of December 31, 1935 was 94,665, the average monthly consumption per meter was 1,850.60 cubic feet, while the average monthly gas bill per family consumer was 10.36 paper pesos. The length of new gas mains laid during 1935 was 23,252 feet.

GRAIN ELEVATORS. - For some time it has been obvious that storage facilities throughout Argentina have been inadequate, and one of the most important decisions made by the Government during the latter part of 1935 was to approve of a plan covering the construction of a network of elevators throughout the country, which is to consist of fifteen terminal units and 321 local units, the total cost to approximate 105,000,000 pesos. 55,000,000 pesos is to be spent for the terminals, and some 38,000,000 pesos for the smaller elevators, and the completion of this plan, which will require about four years, should give this country storage facilities favorably comparable to those of any other country in the world.

SECONDARY INDUSTRIES

The record of Argentina's secondary industries through the year, such enterprises as boot and shoe manufacturing, electrical equipment production, refining, tobacco production, the automotive industry, and comparable enterprises, was quite favorable, and in most cases activity in these categories was higher than during the previous year. Production passed readily into consumption, due to the improved financial and economic condition throughout the country, and indications are that 1936 will witness even further increases of activity in these several lines.

BOOTS AND SHOES. - For some years Argentina has had a thriving manufacturing industry which has turned out boots and shoes for domestic consumption. The latest statistics available cover the year 1934, and for that period 491 factories were in operation, representing a capitalization of 46,000,000 pesos. Production during that year amounted to slightly more than 14,000,000 pairs of leather shoes, and 40,500,000 pairs of so-called "Economicos," which are cheap fabric footwear with rope or cloth soles. The 1934 production was valued at 116,213,000 pesos, the leather shoes accounting for 80,726,000 pesos, and the "economicos" for 35,487,000 pesos.

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Argentina's boot and shoe industry has so consolidated itself that there are few importations into this market from either European or American manufacturers, excepting shoes of the very highest quality. On the other hand, the production of medium and cheap grades is such as to encourage exports, and it is understood that several prospective foreign markets are now being investigated, particularly the Union of South Africa.

ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT. - The manufacture and assembly of radios in this territory has increased during the past few years, and 1935 showed a continuation of this trend. Due to the high duty on completed sets, it is impossible to import other than the most expensive models, and the Argentine industry, in addition to its assembly work, is now manufacturing such things as receivers, condensers, loud speakers, coils, sockets, transformers, cables, resistors, and cabinets. A radio tube manufacturing establishment has also been opened, which is partially owned by private capital and partly by the radio manufacturers of this country. The success which has attended this venture is indicated by the fact that the plant is now to be enlarged.

There are no accurate or reliable statistics available regarding the probable census of radio sets in Argentina. However, it is known that sales during the past several years have been quite heavy, and the saturation point has by no means been reached, particularly in the lower priced lines. Local broadcasting activities are being continually improved upon, and the interest in short wave reception from overseas sources is gaining ground.

The manufacture of electrical refrigeration was very active during the past year, as practically all of these units are produced within the country by branches of well-known American producers. Some years ago an electric refrigerator in a private home or an apartment was an anomaly, but the modernization of apartments which now presumes such a refrigerator as standard equipment has led the way, and the sales field has widened, not only into older apartments, but into private homes as well. It is believed that Argentina offers a particularly good market for electrical refrigerators for some years to come.

A great deal of basic work has been done with air conditioning, both in public establishments such as theaters and restaurants, as well as apartment buildings. Buenos Aires boasts of having the largest apartment house in the world that is air conditioned, and there are several others of smaller dimensions which are also so equipped. The manufacture of electric stoves has increased, as has the production of sundry other electrical items.

REFINING. - While Argentina is a producer in her own right of considerable crude petroleum, she is not as yet self-sufficient in this respect. The totals of crude production over the past five years have shown a steady improvement, that is, in 1930 the production of crude amounted to 1,431,107 metric tons, the year following production was 1,861,413 tons; for 1932 it was 2,088,831 tons; for 1933 2,176,559 tons; and for 1934 2,229,714 tons.

In addition to the domestically produced crude, it has been found necessary to import both petroleum and refined products from overseas sources. Peru has so far been the most important source for these crude imports, although Central America has supplied appreciable quantities from time to time. However, the most characteristic development over the course of the last several years is the trend toward imports of crude materials which can be refined by the plants now in operation in Argentina. Some years ago this

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country was a heavy importer of gasoline and kerosene, but purchases of this type of material have dwindled to very low levels, as domestic requirements are now being almost entirely taken care of by the local refineries. Some Diesel oil is still imported, and purchases of high grade lubricating oils are still made from overseas suppliers, but it is expected that before many years, even this country's requirements in lubricating oils and other highly refined petroleum products will be manufactured by the domestic industry.

TOBACCO. - In common with many sections of the world, Argentina has developed a domestic tobacco manufacturing industry which very largely controls the local market. While some tobacco is raised locally, much of the higher grade cigarette and cigar leaf is imported, the 1935 imports being estimated at slightly over 28,500,000 lbs. of leaf, as compared with 16,000,-000 lbs. for the previous year. The most recent statistics available regarding the tobacco industry cover the year 1934. For that period 576 manufacturing establishments were in existence, although probably not more than a dozen of these were factories of any consequence. During 1934 702,709,000 packages of cigarettes, valued at 134,612,000 pesos were produced, as compared with 673,916,000 packages valued at 132,227,000 pesos during 1933. The 1934 production of cigars numbered 362,279,000, with a value of 15,206,-000 pesos, an appreciable increase over the 1933 totals which were 126,347,000 cigars valued at 12,352,000 pesos.

Revenue collections during 1933 on tobacco products amounted to 62,138,960 pesos. For the following year this aggregate increased to 64,124,797 pesos, and for the first nine months of 1935 collections had amounted to 66,810,396 pesos. The higher 1935 taxes were partially due to the application of Law No. 12,148, which raised the revenue charges on tobacco products, but it is estimated in the trade that for the year it will be found that considerably larger numbers of cigarettes and cigars will have been produced.

The tobacco industry has suffered somewhat from the imposition of Law 12,148, although the trend has of course been toward the purchase and popularity of cheaper brands. It is hoped that some relief under this measure will be granted by the Government. There were certain other difficulties in the industry, particularly along distribution lines and efforts of wholesalers to restrict marketing through their establishments, but concerted action on the part of manufacturers has prevented the continuation of what might be described as artificial conditions, particularly in the metropolitan sections where the manufacturers are undertaking distribution themselves.

AUTOMOTIVE ASSEMBLING. - One of the most encouraging features of industrial activity during the past year was the strengthening trend in the activity of local automotive assembly plants. While most of the larger and more expensive automobiles are still imported direct, practically all of the passenger automobiles and trucks that fall in the low-priced categories are imported, knocked down; and assembled in one of the three assembly plants in Argentina. During the year 1935 12,257 low priced automobiles were sold, as compared with 4,541 units for 1934. There is to a certain extent a trend toward the assembling of cars, even in the middle price brackets, but in calculating the activity of the assembly plants, it can be taken as a reasonable certainty that the figures given above represent automobiles and trucks actually assembled by the plants now in operation in this country.

RUBBER MANUFACTURING. - On an average, activity throughout the rubber manufacturing field during 1935 was somewhat lower than during the previous year, probably in the vicinity of 80% of the 1934 average. This was due to

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a number of factors, although one of the dominant features was the threatened drought and the adverse effect that this had upon the outlook in rural communities.

The production of tire casings during 1935 is estimated at approximately 290,000 units, and it is believed that for the coming year this total will probably increase to something like 335,000 units. Inner tubes produced in 1935 numbered about 300,000 units, and prospects for the new year indicate an increase of something like 40,000 units in this particular line. Rubber heels, the other important local manufacture, numbered something like 2,850,000 for the past year, and it is expected that the 1936 total will be about 3,000,000.

AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENTS.- Conditions in the rural area were, as has been suggested in previous sections of this report, far from favorable during the latter half of 1935, and as consequence the demand for agricultural implements was restricted. This condition was reflected upon the domestic manufacturers, and while the producers of windmills, combines, and plows, not to mention various other lines, were fairly well engaged, their productive activity was very definitely below capacity.

MISCELLANEOUS.- Among other industries which might be mentioned as having had a successful year of operations during 1935 are the local breweries, the manufacturing of hats, the production of pharmaceutical products, and wool washing. The motion picture industry was fairly active, although the number of releases for this market did not in any way compare with the number imported from overseas. The manufacture of certain types of industrial machinery such as shovels, concrete mixers, dump cars, etc. continued and improved, and in the textile industry there was a healthy appreciation of activity. In this latter category it is worthy of note that a new cotton yarn factory is about to be completed, while a new rayon factory is also under construction. It is expected that both of these new plants will be in production during the latter part of the present year.

TRANSPORTATION.- At the conclusion of 1935 there were in operation throughout Argentina about 31,380 miles of railways. No data as regards the operation of the Government owned lines are available at the moment, but the trend indicated in the preliminary record covering the private owned lines undoubtedly is also true of the Government lines. The following tables gives provisional statistics for the privately owned railways in Argentina for the year 1935 as compared with 1934. Freight traffic improved by slightly more than 2,000,000 metric tons, while passenger traffic decreased by almost 2,500,000 persons. Both gross revenue and expenditure increased, while gross and net profits decreased.

	1934	1935	Difference
Goods carried	36,877,029 tons	39,073,300 tons	+ 2,196,271
Passengers carried	136,035,688 m/n.	133,629,600 m/n.	- 2,406,088
Gross receipts	435,938,000 m/n.	436,889,000 m/n.	+ 951,000
Expenditures	322,559,000 m/n.	329,321,000 m/n.	+ 6,762,000
Gross profits	113,379,000 m/n.	107,568,000 m/n.	- 5,811,000
Net Profits	56,202,000 m/n.	54,240,000 m/n.	- 1,962,000

The high points of the year under discussion include the gradual improvement in freight traffic, the introduction of a number of new Diesel powered cars and coaches, more extensive propaganda work on the part of the railways toward the increased production of fruit and cotton in suitable areas, and an unmistakable trend toward the consolidation of the administrative staff's. The first experiment along this line has now been under way for approximately six

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months, and it is believed that, particularly in the case of the large private railways, it is not necessary to maintain separate and distinct executive staffs for each line. If the experiment toward consolidation is successful, and there seems to be no reason why it should be otherwise, a distinct saving in expenses, and a real simplification of operating detail should be effected.

The year witnessed a certain amount of labor trouble, but the disputes that arose were largely isolated instances, and none of them merit the description of major incidents. The reconstruction of the Transandine Railway was studied in detail, and toward the end of the Argentine Government appropriated 5,614,489 pesos for work along this line. However, the actual operation of this railway must depend upon the creation of adequate traffic between the Argentine and Chile, and prospects, at least at the moment, do not appear particularly optimistic.

Many of the London managers of the railways in which British capital is heavily interested visited Argentina during the year, especially with the idea in mind of trying to come to some arrangement with the Government which would permit what they claim would be a more equitable transfer of funds from Argentina to England by way of interest and dividends upon stocks and bonds. Those British companies are decidedly of the opinion that the present exchange restrictions seriously prejudice the rights of British investors, and everything is being done to try to convince the Argentine Government that more lenient regulations should be inaugurated insofar as those transfers of funds are concerned.

There were 754.9 miles of street railway lines in service at the end of 1935. Records indicate that receipts from traffic improved somewhat during the year, but the general condition of the companies is by no means happy, as it is becoming increasingly apparent that the more rapid and mobile means of transportation, such as busses and "colectivos" are establishing themselves as the popular transport agencies. There seems little prospect of the street railway companies improving their standing to any market degree.

The Buenos Aires subways functioned throughout the year without any major difficulties, and new construction work undertaken includes the complimentary line from Retiro station to the Diagonal Norte, which will connect with the line which is already open from the Diagonal to Constitution Station. When this complimentary line has been completed, it will be possible for a passenger to travel from Constitucion to Retiro across the busiest section of the city via subway. The C.H.A.D.O.P.Y.F. also started work during 1935 on the subway line which is to connect the lower business section of Buenos Aires with the suburb of Belgrano. Progress is reported satisfactory, although it will probably be some three years before the line is completed.

Automotive transport activities increased throughout the year, and the most recent statistics available indicate that in the municipal area of Buenos Aires there were 3,156 colectivos, 1,655 busses, and 3,718 taxis in operation. Colectivos especially have cut into the traffic of the street railway companies, while the busses have not only gained popularity in the city, but suburban and rural lines of passenger as well as freight transport have shown a strong progressive trend.

Opposition to these modern developments from the railways resulted in the Chamber of Deputies passing what is commonly known as the Transportation Coordination Bill, which creates a commission which will have power to control all transportation agencies throughout the country. A similar bill is also under consideration covering the Federal Capital alone. It is feared that if

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these bills are approved and passed by the Senate, the automotive transport interests will be seriously jeopardized, but it would appear hardly likely that such a reactionary policy will be sanctioned by the Government, despite the pressure which is being brought to bear by the vested railway interests.

Shipping activities improved during the year as compared with 1935, thereby reflecting the increased import and export trade enjoyed by Argentina. For the year just closed 4,352 steamships with a registered net tonnage of 10,389,173 entered Argentine ports, while during 1934 there entered 2,751 steamers with a registered net tonnage of 10,075,594.

COMMUNICATIONS.- Possibly the most important single development during the year occurred on July 9th, when all telephone services in Argentina and Paraguay were inter-connected. This action embraced the Union Telefonica, Entrerriana de Telefonos, Internaciona de Telefonos, Telegrafico-Telefonica Nacional, Telegrafico-Telefonica de La Plata, and La Argentina de Cruz del Eje. This inter-connection or coordination for the first time of all Argentine telephone services as well as those in Paraguay, made it possible for a subscriber to one system to communicate with a subscriber to another system. It also made it possible for the first time for telephonic connections from any part of Argentina or Paraguay to any of the 55 foreign countries with which services are now maintained by the international company.

Statistics are unobtainable regarding each individual telephone company, but the largest of those services, a foreign owned organization, reports that during 1935 approximately 21,000,000 paper pesos was expended in extensions and improvements to its plant. This investment was made in additional local and toll lines, cables, and other telephone plants, including 6,200 lines of automatic central office equipment, which, in addition to improved service conditions, permitted connecting 12,163 new telephones to those already in service at the beginning of the year.

This company reports a general improvement for last year as compared with 1934, as shown by the following table.

	1934	1935
Automatic telephones in service	181,275	187,596
Manual telephones in service	<u>85,543</u>	<u>91,385</u>
TOTAL	266,818	278,981
Miles of open wire, exchange aerial	111,731	113,500
Miles of wire in exchange cables	1,427,318	1,530,000
Miles of open wire in toll lines	87,186	88,500
Miles of toll wire in cables	<u>47,644</u>	<u>48,000</u>
TOTAL	1,673,879	1,780,000

The number of domestic long distance calls completed by the company under discussion was 7,821,304 during 1934, and 8,770,107 during 1935. The number of international long distance calls completed was 68,925 for 1934, and this total increased to 89,893 for 1935. During the year radio-telephone communication was extended to Ireland, to Iceland, and to Honduras, enlarging the number of countries connected by radio-telephone to Argentina to fifty-five, and placing the subscribers of the Argentine telephone service within reach of approximately 36,000,000 telephones throughout the world.

In the field of telegraphy the one event of major importance during 1935 was the Government's decision to restrict telegraphic traffic to

From A.A. Argentina

Report No. 5004

March 17, 1936

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Government owned lines, at the expense of the railway telegraphic services, excepting in those localities where no Government stations exist. The railways strenuously opposed this Government regulation, without avail, and while reports indicate that a comparatively large number of railway telegraphic operators have been thrown out of work, it is believed that positions are being found for them in other departments.

Radio developments have been of particular importance during 1935. The year saw the completion and the inauguration of the "El Mundo" station, LR-1, which is claimed to be the most modern and the most powerful broadcasting station in Latin America. The Government has undertaken the administration of a radio station which will be used exclusively for official purposes, although this particular unit will not be completed for some months. Radio programs have improved measurably during recent months. The fact that no operation tax is charged upon radio stations has resulted in extensive private advertising over the radio, very closely comparable to that used in the United States, but the variety and the quality of supporting programs was much better during 1935, due largely to the intelligence of the sponsors of the programs, and also to the appreciation manifest by the listeners. The radio is rapidly becoming an important means of reaching people throughout the country, particularly in rural sections where communications with such population centers as Buenos Aires are at best comparatively poor.

Source: Commercial Attaché'

Frederick D. Sharp
Frederick D. Sharp
Capt., G.S.,
Military Attaché'

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C-2 Report

ARGENTINA (Combat)

Subject: Recruitment.

(a) Liability to Military Service RECEIVED W.D. MAR 2- 1928

Under the Argentine law No. 4707, Military service in Argentina is compulsory from the 20th till the 45th year. During the 20th year a certain number of men are called for active duty for one year. This number varies with the budget and has been between 12,000 and 15,000 during the last few years. The remainder of the 20th year class and all others up to the 30th year are the reserves of the permanent Army. During this period they are subject to call for maneuvers for periods of 1 month each. In time of war or threatened war, the President by decree may call out all the reserves.

In reaching his 30th year the citizen passes to the National Guard where during peace he is subject to call to the colors for instruction in four periods of 15 days each during the 10 years. Instruction is under the jurisdiction of the Government of the Province and under the National Government for the Federal Capital and National Territories. The entire National Guard may be called for duty on decree of the President in case of threatened war.

The Territorial Guard is composed of those citizens from 40 till their 45th year. This body cannot be called for any duty except in case of National War.

The law covering the Military Service carries certain exemptions as: Physically unfit; sole dependency of mother or father or minor sister or brother who are orphans; certain National and Provincial employees; and members of the Clergy.

The enforcement of this law during peace is far from ideal. It is common gossip that sons of wealthy influential men never serve in the Army. If they fail to secure exemption from the boards through false medical certificates or otherwise, then they enter the Officers Reserve training camps for three months and become an officer of the Reserve.

A Military attaché from a neighboring country who has been attached to a Legation here for eight years, informed the undersigned that he has never known a son of any prominent family to serve a year in the Army.

Resident aliens are not subject to Military Service. Children born in Argentina of alien parents are considered Argentine citizens and are subject to Military Law.

Argentines who have taken out naturalization papers in other countries are still obliged to perform their Military duty in Argentina.

Foreigners who become naturalized citizens of Argentina are

From: M.A. Argentina. Report No. 3865. February 8th, 1928

...GRENADA (Combat)

Subject: Recruitment.

(a) Liability to Military Service

are exempt for 16 years from the date of matriculation from
the Royal College of Military Arts.

In addition to the above, there are five or six thousand
voluntarily enlisted troops. There are still several troops such
as students in the non-commissioned officer's schools, students
in technical schools, military bands etc. These positions
are much smaller after completion of the student courses, and there
is no difficulty in keeping the other bodies recruited to
full authorized strength.

From: M.A. Argentina. Report No. 3865. February, 8th, 1928

U. S. Report

Subject: recruitment.

III. Recruiting methods and facilities.

Complete statistics on enrollment are kept in the offices of the various military districts and each year a list is decided which 30% of those of the age recruited who are enrolled will be called for service in the Army and Navy. At the various districts in which the conscript lives he reports for medical examination and submits any application for exemption. After these matters are settled the accepted conscripts are forwarded by the military district authorities to the units to which he is assigned and there he is armed and checked.

The procedure in war would be no different provided the records of military districts are up to date and assignments made for all personnel. The undersigned has been informed that such work has not yet been completed but it is being actively pushed and in another year all personnel of reserves of the permanent army at least will be accurately listed with units, mobilization centers, etc.

Military Service is not popular with the better class Argentine. He evades it if possible. The lower classes furnish the backbone of the peace army. About 30% cannot read and write on incorporation in the army and at the end of the year some 90% of the 30% have been taught to read and write. So successful has this work been that the Bureau of Education has recommended that all exemptions be waived for illiterates and they be incorporated for their military duty.

Economic, political and international situations have no effect on this law. During the past year when 4900 reserves were called for training there was a movement started to discourage reserves from reporting. The "Liga Patriotica" started propaganda against that movement and 93% of the reserves reported on the date specified.

Sources:

Organic Military Law.
General Orders from the Minister of War.

C. D. Bishop
From: U. S. Argentina. Report No. 3865. February 8, 192.

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ARGENTINA (Continued)

Subject: Recruitment

(a) Liability to Military Service.

Supplementing paragraph 3 of the Current Events for the month of October, and in conformity with instructions contained in current criticisms of reports the following report is submitted:

The Executive Power issued a decree on October 3rd through the War Department, whereby it calls to the colours the conscripts of the military class of 1909.

The number of conscripts to be called out in the different divisions of the Army is as follows:

First Division: 1385 to serve in the Navy and 4335 to serve in the Army.

Second Division: 1385 to serve in the Navy and 6552 to be incorporated in the Army.

Third Division: 2693 to be incorporated with the Navy and 5814 with the Army.

Fourth Division: 1347 to serve in the Navy and 5176 in the Army.

Fifth Division: 1347 citizens to serve in the Navy and 3724 to be incorporated with the Army.

The total number of citizens called to the colors is 36,098 of whom 11,000 will serve in the Navy and 25,098 in the Army.

The date for the presentation of the conscripts is fixed for the 15th of January next for those who are to serve in the Army, and for the 1st of March for those to be incorporated with the Navy.


From: M.A. Argentina. Report No. 4059 November 14, 1929

FOR OFFICIAL USE
ONLY
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ARGENTINA (Combat)

Subject: Recruitment

(a) Liability to Military Service.

Service is compulsory for one year, unless sooner discharged, as for qualification in arms when it is for three months. Voluntary enlistments are open to men who have not been called for service and conscripts who have completed their service.

Exemption from Military Service will be made in the following manner:

1) Every citizen who desires exemption should appear with proofs before a Federal Judge. The decision will be made by assistance of an Attorney General who will investigate whether there does or does not exist the reasons alleged, and when poverty is claimed, whether or not the candidate is destitute. If the Judge approves the application, the interested party will present this evidence to the Chief of the Military District in which he resides who will grant the exemption. The applicant will previously pay the fee unless it is a case of destitution.

2)a) The citizen who pleads physical disability will submit his application to the Chief of the Military District and the Medical Officer will approve or disapprove it. If disapproved, appeal may be made through Channels to the Minister of War. If exempted, all expenses will be refunded him.

b) Application for exemption on account of physical disability may be made any time before induction, but such application will be considered at the same time as others of the same class.

c) Application for exemption on account of physical disability coming after the call of his class will be considered at the date of first induction of his class after receipt of the application.

If application has not been decided by the date of induction, the citizen must report for duty and await the decision on his application.

The exemption is a personal right and must be exercised personally and not through representation except in cases of total disability.

The Argentine citizen who fails to enroll and the conscript who fails to report on the day specified without just cause, will be compelled to serve one year's service in addition to the regular service prescribed by this law.

The member of the reserve who fails to report on the date specified without just cause will be compelled to serve two months continuous service in addition to the period for which called.

From M.A.Argentina

Report No.5115

March 18, 1935.

ARGENTINA (Combat)

Subject: Recruitment

(a) Liability to Military Service.

An equal penalty will be imposed on the National Guard.

The exempted citizen who does not report the fact, if the cause of exemption no longer exists will be compelled to serve one month in addition to the service required by the present law.

The exempted who do not renew their application in time fixed will, besides the military tax, pay the same amount as a fine; if they fail to do that, then they will serve one month in jail when it is physical disability; otherwise, six months with the troops.

Members of the exemption board who should make an unjust accusation will be punished by arrest from eight days to a month.

The civilian members of the board who unlawfully grant an exemption will be imprisoned from three months to a year and an officer of the Army with the loss of his commission. Medical officers who make false certificates as to physical disability will be prohibited from practising for two years and if an officer of the Army with the loss of his commission.

The member of the exemption Board who remits unlawfully the military tax on grounds of poverty, will himself be compelled to pay the tax and will be imprisoned from eight days to a month.

Other infractions of the law will be punished by disciplinary action.

Each citizen from the age of 20 to 45 years legally exempted from Military Service is obliged to pay an annual tax called a Military Tax, in the following manner.

1) Total exemption from Military Service will be made on a written instrument stamped by a special stamp of the Minister of War, which costs \$25 m/n.

2) Similar paper will be used by citizens exempted from reserve service except that the cost of the stamp is \$12.00 m/n.

3) Similar paper will be used for the National Guard except with a stamp of \$6.00 m/n.

4) Similar paper for the Territorial Guard, with a stamp of \$2.00.

The tax will be paid when the exemption is authorized and renewed each year.

Resident aliens are not liable for service. However, sons of aliens born in this country are required to do their military service.

Frederick D. Sharp
FREDERICK D.SHARP

Captain, G.S.
MILITARY ATTACHE

(Source of Information:
Translation of Organic Military Law)

Report No.5115 March 18, 1935.

FOR OFFICIAL USE
ONLY

G-2 Report

6240

ARGENTINA (Combat)

Subject: Recruitment.

(b) Recruiting Methods and Facilities.

Most boys of rich families try to avoid service in the Army, under certificate system discussed in Report No.5115, Index 6240 (a). Service is not popular.

Source of Information: Personal Contacts

(5)

Fredenck Sharp
FREDERICK D. SHARP,
Captain, G.S.,
Military Attaché Report No.5116 March 18, 1935.

5-1-2001-162

U.S. GOVERNMENT

5,240-a.

C-2 Report.

ARGENTINA - Combat.

Subject: Liability to Military Service;
Citizenship Training.

All males born in Argentina are subject to one year's service with the Colors when they reach their 20th birthday. At present 50,000 men annually report for this duty.

La Nacion in an editorial, January 16, 1938, points out that this 50,000 a year means 500,000 citizens in ten years who have served their allotted time, and it suggests that the training should be such, aside from purely military instruction, as to fit the young men to be better citizens than they were when they joined up.

The newspaper declares that the responsibility of the armed forces in moulding the characters of these recruits during twelve months is great. "It does not need a profound analysis to discover the moral and educative influence which officers and sub-officers can exercise on the character of this mass which is destined later, and for many years, to affect the destinies of the country.

"Changed conditions from those when military service was destined purely to furnish armed forces for the country obliges us today to consider the barracks as one of the schools most appropriate to develop a high grade of citizenship. To accomplish this mission, it is necessary, in the first place, that the professionals of the armed institutions should be perfectly competent for a high educational standard of instruction. It appears to be fundamental that the cadet and the aspirant for sub-official should be trained for this future work.

"In view of the importance of this question, we judge that periodic lectures should be given by a competent high official to the conscripts; these lectures to be based on the moral and civic virtues which must regulate the life of the citizen in the society of the State."

Source: La Nacion.

Lester Baker,
Lester Baker, Col. Inf.,
Military Attaché.

Original & 4 copies airmailed Jan. 22nd.
Confirmation copy by steamer Jan. 22nd.

1938
MIL. ATTACHÉ
D. 2001-164
JUN 1
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
6,240-a.

G-2 Report.

ARGENTINA - Combat.

Subject: Liability to Military Service;
Citizenship Training.

All males born in Argentina are subject to one year's service with the Colors when they reach their 20th birthday. Under the procedure, they register with the local justice of the peace when they attain the age of 18, and are called up two years later by the military authorities.

At present there are about 50,000 men annually reaching the age for military service who go before a selection board. There are exemptions in certain cases, and many are rejected for physical defects. The latest figures show that 33,000 conscripts were selected for training of the total reporting for last year's class. The majority of those not accepted were for physical defects - as high as 75% rejections for the Province of Corrientes.

"La Nacion" in a recent editorial pointed out that in addition to the military training, and the value of having 33,000 men pass to the reserve army each year, the Government should include in its training the fundamental principles of citizenship.

The newspaper declares that the responsibility of the armed forces in moulding the characters of these recruits during twelve months is great. "It does not need a profound analysis to discover the moral and educative influence which officers and sub-officers can exercise on the character of this mass which is destined later, and for many years, to affect the destinies of the country.

"Changed conditions from those when military service was destined purely to furnish armed forces for the country, obliges us today to consider the barracks as one of the schools most appropriate to develop a high grade of citizenship. To accomplish this mission, it is necessary, in the first place, that the professionals of the armed institutions should be perfectly competent for a high educational standard of instruction. It appears to be fundamental that the cadet and the aspirant for sub-official should be trained for this future work.

"In view of the importance of this question, we judge that periodic lectures should be given by a competent high official to the conscripts; these lectures to be based on the moral and civic virtues which must regulate the life of the citizen in the society of the state".

Source: Personal contacts;
La Nacion.

Note: this report replaces #5707(6240-a) of January 18, 1938. *Lester Baker*
Lester Baker, Col. Inf.,
Military Attaché.

Original & 5 copies mailed May 7th.

6-1-2001-162

7

6,240-a.

G-2 Report.

ARGENTINA - Combat.

Subject: Liability to Military Service;
Argentina and Italy Sign Accord.

Buenos Aires SEP 10 1938

On August 8, 1938, at the Foreign Office in Buenos Aires an accord was signed by the Italian Ambassador and Argentine Foreign Minister Cantillo stipulating the status of sons of Italian parents in Argentina and those of Argentine parents in Italy as to compulsory military service in each case.

By this brief convention it is provided that, in time of peace, sons of Italian parents, born in Argentina, are exempted from military obligations under Italian laws, on giving proof that they have complied with the Argentine military laws regarding compulsory military service. Similarly, Argentine-born sons of Italian parents are exempted from military obligations in Argentina on proof that they have complied with Italian requirements in this respect.

In notes exchanged by the signatory officials at the time, it was stated that the documents required were the "enrolment book" which is issued to every Argentina-born male by the military authorities in his particular district, and corresponding documentary proof by Italian military authorities in case of service in Italy.

The agreement is similar to signed in 1927 by Argentina and France except that it goes farther by specifying the documentary proof required. This was absent from the Franco-Argentine agreement and has caused much confusion in the years since its signing.

A statement issued by the Press Section of the Italian Embassy in Buenos Aires after the event pointed out that it does not apply to persons born of Argentine parents in Italy, as both contracting parties consider them to be of Argentine nationality.

La Prensa in commenting on the accord and its implications of nationality through blood rather than place of birth, says that if European nations are to carry the theory to its logical conclusion then there are no Americans in the Western Hemisphere except the descendants of the original Indians.

Source: Press.

Lester Baker
Lester Baker, Col. Inf.,
Military Attaché.

Original & 5 copies mailed Aug. 20th.

Report

Argent. 1628
1928 MAR 20
6200

ARGENTINA (Cont'd)

Subject: Personnel

(a) National Characteristics.

The personnel for the Argentine Army consists of the annual conscripts from the 20 year old citizens, the non-commissioned officers, enlisted men (civilian), the commissioned officers.

The conscripts are supposed to be selected by lot from all citizens of that age. As a matter of fact the sons of families with either wealth or influence do not serve in the Army. They are exempted on certificates sometimes false and in the last extremity they enter the reserve officers training camp for a period of three months and are then commissioned as Sub Lieutenants of the Reserve.

30% of Argentina's conscripts cannot read and write. The morals of Argentine men have the reputation of being far from the highest and their regard for women is very low. They drink very little, however they gamble to excess and the use of drugs is not uncommon. They easily adapt themselves to military life and it is believed their endurance and stamina is above the average Latin American. The Argentine is inclined to be arrogant and conceited yet history shows him with considerable courage. While he may be lacking a bit in initiative yet he is quick to grasp ideas and select what is best for his own needs. Everything considered, it can be said that the Argentine man makes a very good soldier when trained and disciplined.

From: M.A. Argentina. Report No. 3866. February 16, 1928

G-2 Report

6100

Argentine (Cont'd.)
Subject: Personnel.

ANNUAL REPORT OF OFFICERS

The commissioned officers in the Argentine branches and departments in the regular service, graduate from the Military College. Recruits who train the Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery Officers' School and all attend the Cavalry School. This gives them opportunity exists for the Argentine Army Officer to perfect himself professionally. Since the commissioners are in service only one year, a very large percentage of commissioned personnel in enlisted year after year in receiving elementary training to recruits. This naturally affects the advancement and training of officers in the handling of larger units. The number of students available to attend the school are small and the courses not so broad and thorough as the service schools in the United States.

From very limited personal observation in other countries, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the average Argentine Officer is slightly inferior in professional qualifications to the Chilean and superior to all others in South America. He is considered inferior to the average United States officer in breeding and education as well as in moral and mental traits.

The Argentine Army register of this date shows:

RANK	NUMBER OF OFFICERS		
	ACTIVE	RETIRED	RESERVE
Lt. General	--	8	--
Major General	7	11	--
Brigadier General	14	43	--
Colonels	73	105	--
Lieutenant colonel	129	235	--
Majors	218	161	--
Captains	304	201	3
First Lieutenants	220	82	2
Lieutenants	285	64	11
Sub Lieutenants	372	34	2725
TOTAL	1625	944	2741

These are regularly commissioned and governed by the organic military law. The total number above exceeds the number specified in the organic law by more than 100. This is due to promotion being made according to law but with no elimination as the law provided originally - Officers are eliminated now only for disqualification.

In addition there are the "Asimilados" who have rank and pay of different grades but the numbers depend on the annual budget. This register this date shows the following:

From: M.A. Argentina. Report No. 3866. February 16, 1928

(a) Arm (Combat)

Subject: Personnel

(b) Commissioners, Officers, (Non-Commissioned)

RANK	ACTIVE	RESERVE	
Brigadier General	6	2	8
Colonels	16	2	18
Lt. Colonel	46	26	72
Major	37	22	59
Captain	77	43	120
First Lieutenant	118	24	142
Lieutenant	120	22	142
Sub Lieutenant	132	69	222
TOTAL	520	214	931

It may be noted that the number of "Asimilados" shown as active does not agree exactly with the number shown in GCO. The last table of organization showing assignment of "Asimilados" as of 1925, while the above number is from the budget for 1928. These "Asimilados" are given "commissions" in Medical Corps, Administration Departments, Judge Advocate and Tribunals, Masters of Sword and Gymnasium, Band Masters and clergy.

For the "Asimilados", the source of supply is civilians after special training and examinations for the different departments.

PROMOTION.

Promotion is by selection in the manner described as follows:

There are separate promotion lists for each arm of service from Sub-Lieutenant to Colonel inclusive. The Law further provides that there will be a complete rotation of officers in the different grades as follows: Sub Lieutenant in three years; Lieutenant, Brigadier and Major Generals, four years; First Lieutenant, Major and Lt. Colonel, five years; and Captains and Colonels in six years. In all grades except Sub Lieutenant an officer must remain a minimum of 4 years before being promoted. Promotion lists are made up for each grade with as many sections or fractions in the grade as specified in the above for years of the complete rotation. In each fraction or section officers take rank according to length of service in the grade. The seniors being in the first fraction and are the ones to be considered for promotion. The promotion from the first fraction of each grade to the next higher grade, from Sub Lieutenant to Colonel is by selection by the Classification Board composed of the Director of Personnel and the Commanding General of each of the five Divisions, except when considering officers of the War Department branches, when the Chief of the Department concerned will be an additional member.

From: M.A. Argentina. Report No. 3866. February 16, 1928

(b) COMMISSIONED OFFICERS (Army)

Subject: Personnel

(b) COMMISSIONED OFFICERS (CONT'D)

Promotion from Colonel to Major General is by selection by the Minister of War from all the Colonels. From Brigadier General upward promotion is made by the Minister of War.

Officers entitled to promotion may request promotion and the Minister will be authorized to make a desired list and may call relative to information or opinion of any on their promotion. Request written signed to made early in case of change in qualifications.

Officers in the Air Service may request one promotion to higher grade as soon as they complete the minimum service in the lower grade.

Promotion in time of war may be made for distinguished service or heroic action without regard to length of service or status of an officer with respect to other provisions established above.

Pay.

The base salary of the Commissioned Officers of the Argentine Army is:

RANK	DAILY PAY YORK				
	Base Pay	Active Service	Mounted Service	Total m/n	Currency
Lieutenant General	1850	350	15	2215	920
Major General	1550	350	15	1915	813
Brigadier General	1350	350	15	1715	728
Colonel	1000	300	15	1315	558
Lt. Colonel	800	200	15	1015	431
Major	670	130	15	815	346
Captain	470	80	15	585	240
First Lieutenant	380	70	15	465	197
Lieutenant	335	65	15	415	176
Sub Lieutenant	290	60	15	365	155

Each officer receives an increase of 10% when he has completed the minimum time in each grade (3 years for sub.Lt. and 4 for all others)

Aviation Officers receive 25% of the pay of their grade additional.

Officers on duty out of the country receive their salary in gold pesos equal to paper salary at home (2.35 times home salary)

The Inspector General of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, The Commanders of Division, Chiefs of the War Department Branches, President of the Supreme Counsel of War

From: M.A. Argentina. Report No. 3866. February 16, 1928

ARTICLE (Continued)

Subject: Personnel.

(b) Commissioned Personnel (cont'd.)

and Marine, Judge Advocate, General of Art and Marine, the Secretary of the War Department, the Judge Advocate and the members of the Supreme Council of War for Commissioned Officers, are given the sum of 550 m/n per month for representation expenses.

The Inspector Generals of the different branches, Directors of Schools, members of the council of war for commissioned officers, the President of the council of war for the troops, Sub-Chiefs of the General Staff are all given the sum of 500 m/n per month for representation expenses.

The Commanders of Regiments, Commanders of Divisions in War Department Branches and members of the Council of War for the troop; are given 450 m/n per month for representation expenses.

The Commanders of Battalions and Commanders of Districts are given 400 m/n per month.

In addition to the above, the officers and family receive medical attention and hospital service. On the death of an officer his widow or dependent children receive a pension of one-half of the officers pay at the time of death.

Retirement - General provisions.

The status of retirement is a definite one. An officer cannot return to active service except in case of mobilization then as a reserve, National Guard or territorial Guard. In these branches he may be promoted. On retirement the officer automatically passes to the reserve till he completes the age limit established for obligatory retirement. Retired officers are relinquished from disciplinary regulations except when in uniform or when occupying certain clerical positions in the offices of the Minister of War. Uniform and title may be used. The officer receives a pension and also may occupy certain specified military and civilian positions. Service in these named positions counts as years of service for purposes of pension.

Retirement may be obligatory, voluntary or administrative. The first is for officers who have reached the age limit in various grade as follows:

Lieutenant General	65 years	Lt. Colonel	54 years
Major General	63 "	Major	50 "
Brigadier General	60 "	Captain	46 "
Colonel	57 "	First Lieutenant	43 "
		Lieutenant	40 "

From: M.A. Argentina. Report No. 3866. February 16th, 1926

3-2 Report

6200

DEFENSE (Cont'd)

Subject: Personnel

(2) Disposition of Officers (cont'd)

Officers may retire at any time when a man's corresponding age reaches 50 years of service. An officer begins when an officer is first placed in the rank of his base pay; with twenty-five years of service he is paid with 30 years service, 70%; and for 30 years or more an officer is retired with full pay. Officers are allowed to resign and leave without any compensation if they are unable to retain him except in time of war. At the end of a year he may return to the service with loss of time and pay from his record of service. Administrative retirement is applied to officers who have been inactive for more than two years from whatever cause. Also to those officers eliminated on promotion. In the latter cases except when elimination is for bad conduct, General officers are retired with rank of the next superior grade and other grades with an increase of pay of 20%.

An officer is placed on the absolute retired list when he is physically disabled for service in case of mobilization and when he has reached the age of obligatory retirement.

Argentine

6200

PARAGUAY (Cont'd)

Subject: General Schwartz

(A) Foreign Activities - Military, Political, Financial
Military.

General Schwartz was born in 1860 at Berlin, Germany. He joined the Argentine Army in 1880 and became a Captain in 1890. In 1895 he was promoted to Major and in 1900 to Lieutenant Colonel. In 1902 he was promoted to Brigadier General and in 1904 to Major General. In 1905 he was appointed Inspector General of the Argentine Army.

General Schwartz is reported to be about 60 years of age. His present position is Brigadier General in the Argentine Army. He is a member of the Argentine Academy of Engineers and is a member of the Argentine Society of Engineers. He has written two books, "Las Fortalezas Antes y despues de la Guerra" and "El pasado y el presente de la Fortificacion y su empleo en la Defensa del Estado". He was an active participant in the Russian-Japanese War and received the cross of Saint George for his services at Port Arthur.

During the war he saw service at the front and about 1915 was made Chief of Engineers of the Russian Army. When the Germans threatened Petrograd in 1918 he assisted in preparing the defense. When conditions became hopeless in Russia General Schwartz went to Paris where in 1923 he became acquainted with the new President, Alvear then Minister to France. At the instance of the latter he signed a contract with the Argentine Government for two years to teach Military Engineering and Fortifications in the Military College and the Escuela Superior de Guerra. At the termination of the contract he continued this service.

General Schwartz has written two books, "Las Fortalezas Antes y despues de la Guerra" and "El pasado y el presente de la Fortificacion y su empleo en la Defensa del Estado". Copies of these publications were forwarded to G-2.

General Schwartz is a personal friend of General W.H. Black, retired from the U.S. Army.

During the period 1900-1914 there was a German Military Mission here and many Argentine Army officers also served in the German Army. After the War some five or six ex-officers who had been members of the former mission came to Argentina on contract. The undersigned is informed that during the manoeuvres in 1925 at Cordoba, five of these Germans practically ran the manoeuvres, ordered Argentine Officers around in a very Prussian manner, etc. The feeling against such procedure was so strong among the Argentine Army officers that the them Inspector General, Uriburu resigned his office and the Germans were put more in the background. The above is now the only one left, one has died, another is now Chief of Staff of the Peruvian Army and the others have disappeared.

Considerable secrecy surrounds General Kretschmar. From reliable sources it is learned that he is on duty with the Office of the Inspector General in an advisory capacity.

From: M.A. Argentina. Report No. 3866. February 16, 1926

ARGENTINA (Continued)

Subject: Personnel

(c) Foreign individuals utilized by the government on
intelligence work.

In one of the training schools, the General receives all tactical courses, tactical 1 and 2, and tactical 3 and 4. He also receives tactical 1 exercises and tactical 2 and 3 exercises. He takes no active part in them now as he is in the staff maneuvers. He does not take part in them now as he is in the staff maneuvers. He generally has accompanied his chief at military exercises. He accompanied the undersecretary of war in the sector of Infantry. He inspired the undersecretary of war in the sector of Infantry.

From a secretary in the German Legation here it is learned that General Kretzchmar is a Russian and during the world war was Chief of Staff of the 6th Turkish Army. He also saw service on the western front.

"La Critica" (yellow journal) published on November 27th 1927 in 3/4 inch type headlines "The Manoeuvres in Lendoza were directed by an Austrian General". No reply was made by the Minister of War. This was not unusual as this paper has during the past year conducted quite a campaign against General Justo and the latter has continually refused to go into print. Once or twice the president came to the aid of the Minister of War with a public statement.

Note:

Photo cards will be sent in on General Schwartz and General Kretzchmar as soon as photographs can be secured.

Argentina (Combat)

Subject: War Council.

(d) Notes upon Commissioned Personnel.

Minister of War
Secretary of the War Department Brig. General Martin J. Justo
Colonel Manuel A. Rodriguez

War Department

Inspector General	Brig. General José B. Belloni
Chief of Staff	Colonel Francisco L. Velez
Administrative Division	Brig. General Tomás Martínez
Personnel	Brig. General José Laglione
Air arsenals (ord)	Colonel Basilio S. Tertine
Instituto Técnico	Brig. General Severo Toranzo
Firing and Gymnasium	Brig. Gen. José A. Rodriguez
Engineers	Colonel Enrique Jauregui
Aviation	Colonel Luis A. Cassinelli
Communication (Signal Corps)	Colonel Alejandro Obligado

First Division

Commander	Brig. General José F. Marcilese
Chief of Staff	Colonel Camilo Idoate

Second Division

Commander	Brig. Gen. Anibal Vernengo
Chief of Staff	Colonel Eduardo Fernandez Valez

Third Division

Commander	Brig. General Alfredo Cordoba
Chief of Staff	Colonel Miguel a Sistero

Fourth Division

Commander	Brig. General Francisco Medina
Chief of Staff	Colonel Juan R. Jones

Fifth Division

Commander	Brig. General Juan E. Vacarezza
Chief of Staff	Colonel Carlos Casanova

Chief of Armament Commission in Brussels:	Brig. General Manuel J. Costa
Chief of State Petroleum	Brig. General Enrique Losconi
Industry, Dept. Agriculture:	Colonel Luis J. Garcia
Sup't of Military College:	Colonel Guillermo Valotta
Director, Superior School of War:	Lt. Colonel Jorge Crespo
Director, Civil Aviation	

From: M.A. Argentina. Report No. 3867 February 17th, 1928

ARTILLERY (COMBAT)

Subject: Personnel.

(c) Who's Who on Commissioned Personnel (cont'd)

Duties of General Officers:

Major General Jose A. Uriburu: Member of the Supreme Council of War and Marine. This officer resigned as Inspector General in 1925 because of a strong feeling throughout the Army against German Instructors. He is a very brilliant officer but very pro German and has shown a very unfriendly feeling towards a member of the United States who says.

Major General Ladislao J. Fernandez: This officer has been in Europe making a study of work pertaining to the Instituto Geografico. He was relieved from that Department at the end of 1926 about the time there was an investigation of forging checks by a Lt. Colonel who was later condemned to prison. General Fernandez returned during January 1928 but as yet has not been assigned to duty. He occupies the status of awaiting orders.

Brig. General Elias C. Alvarez: President of the Court for Commissioned Officers.

Brig. General Licsasio Adalid: Permanent Chief of War Arsenals. He has gone to Europe to study for two years.

Brig. General Emilio V. Sartori: Is in charge of the President's household.

Brig. General Luis Bruce: Awaiting Orders.

"Awaiting Orders" is a position now occupied by Fernandez Bruce and several Colonels at the top of the list who have been jumped in promotion. There are Colonels in Command of three War Department Branches, the Military College and the Superior School of War, all of which are Commands for General Officers.

The Minister of War has followed the policy of putting his friends in strategetic positions and it is natural to surmise that the political situation may be influencing him. It might be noted that he has just placed in command of the Arsenal de Guerra with offices in Arsenal Esteban de Luca an Infantry Officer without any previous technical training - but an excellent soldier. The Arsenal is a most important point in case of Civil trouble in connection with the elections.

Who's Who file on the above personnel will be completed as rapidly as data and photographs are secured.

Retired in 1927: Generals Eduardo Broquen, Nicols Vedia and Gil Juarez.

To Retire in 1928: Generals Recardo Solá and Alonso Baldrich

THE ARMY (Continued)

Argentine Army.

Non-commissioned Officers.

The non-commissioned officers are recruited among the youths, who have completed their secondary studies, and from the middle class, among whom there are many sons of soldiers and sailors. They receive military instruction, which consists of physical training, military discipline, and drill, and receive pay and allowances. After finishing their instruction they may be promoted to Sergeant-Majors (120 pesos monthly), First Sergeants (110 pesos monthly), First Corporals (100 pesos monthly), First Clerks (90 pesos monthly) and Conscripts (5 pesos monthly). They are placed in the Army according to their rank and the needs of the service.

Non-commissioned Officers.

In the Argentine Army the non-commissioned officers are recruited exclusively for this service and are trained in a special school called Non-commissioned Officers' School.

To enter the army as voluntary soldier it is necessary to be in good physical condition, possess good conduct record (proved by certificates from public officials or persons for whom the interested party has worked,) to know how to read and write, and understand the elementary arithmetic operations.

The number of non-Commissioned and Voluntary soldiers is determined annually in the budget. This date there exists:

60 Sergeant-Majors, with a salary of \$200 m/n per month
250 First Sergeants, with a salary of \$170 m/n per month
3 First Sergeants, (Clerks) with a monthly salary of \$170 m/n
900 Sergeants, with a monthly salary of \$140 m/n
10 Sergeants (Clerks) with a monthly salary of \$140 m/n
1010 First Corporals, with a monthly salary of \$120 m/n
10 First Corporals (Clerks) with a monthly salary of \$120 m/n
920 Corporals, with a monthly salary of \$100 m/n
700 Voluntary Soldiers (Buglers & Drummers) \$ 45 m/n
500 Voluntary Soldiers (Candidates for Non-Commissioned Officers) \$ 45 m/n
210 Voluntary Soldiers for the Gendarmerie \$ 70 m/n
410 Voluntary Soldiers (Clerks) \$ 15 m/n
Conscripts \$ 5 m/n

The voluntary soldiers (Clerks) form a special Class. They are recruited among the youths who should do their military service as Conscripts and they must solicit their entry to the Army before they are of an age to be called. Besides being of good physical conditions, moral conditions and intelligent they must know how to use the typewriter. They receive military instruction, but they serve exclusively in the services as Clerks. They may be promoted in time to be Sergeant-Majors. They have all the privileges of the non-

From: L.M.A. Argentina. Report No. 3866 February 16, 1926

ARMED FORCES
Argentine

REGIMENTAL REQUIREMENTS.

Regimental requirements are:

The following is a list of the various requirements for promotion to the rank of Non-Commissioned Officer. These are the minimum requirements. Higher standards may be imposed by the Commandant or General Officer in command with respect to the promotion of Non-Commissioned Officers.

REQUIREMENTS.

The following specifies the rank, duties and conditions of promotion for Non-Commissioned Officers:

Corporal: To have passed satisfactorily a course of Non-Commissioned Officers.

First Corporal: 6 months service as corporal

Sergeant: 6 Months service as First Corporal

First Sergeant: 6 Months service as Sergeant and eligible to substitute provisionally for Subaltern Officer

Sergeant Major: Six months service as First Sergeant

Promotions are made by selection to cover vacancies in the Regiment. They are made by the Commander of the Regiment on the proposal of the commanders of the Units. Promotion to First Sergeant and Sergeant Majors require the approval of the Commander of the Division. The First Sergeants that have served in the files for at least three years with the same rank, can on leaving be promoted to Sub Lieutenant of the Reserve. In time of war when filling vacancies, First Sergeants and Sergeant-Majors can be promoted to Sub Lieutenants.

Bonus for Continued Service. (paid in monthly quotas)

Grades	First	Second	Third	From 15 years
	: 5 years	: 5 years	: 5 years	: Service till
	: Service	: Service	: Service	: retirement
	: min	: min	: min	: min
Corporal	: 120	: 150	: 180	: 240
First Corporal	: 150	: 180	: 240	: 300
Sergeant	: 180	: 240	: 300	: 360
First Sergeant	(240	: 300	: 360	: 480
Assistant Sergeant	(:			

Retirement.

Soldiers may be placed on the retired list:

From: M.A. Argentina. Report No. 3866. February 16, 1928

G-2 Court

2200

ARGENTINA (Continued)
Subject: Personnel
(a) Qualified Personnel (Continued)

1. When wounded in action or disabled in line of duty not through his own fault or negligence. Soldiers retired in these circumstances are promoted to the next higher grade and receive the full active salary.
2. Discharged after 15 years of active service, with the salary of the grade in proportion to the years of service. The extreme limits of the scale are 15 years, 50% of the salary; 35 years the entire salary.

Sources:

Records from the Minister of War
"La Nación" Newspaper
Organic Military Law
Personal Observation.

C. H. Kilday
From: M.A. Argentina. Report No. 3866 February 16th, 1928

FOR OFFICIAL USE

6-1 91 3001-163 1934

CONFIDENTIAL

6200 REPARACIONES

10

G-2 Report

ARGENTINA (Combat)

Subject: Personnel

(d) Who's Who on Commissioned Personnel.

In secret session on July 14th, 1934, the Senate approved the list of promotions submitted by the President as follows:

To the rank of Brigadier General:

Francisco Reynolds
Andres Sabalain
Juan Pistorini

To the rank of Colonel

Manuel Castrillon
Rodolfo Lebrero
Juan Carlos Bassi
Juan Sanguinetti
Juan Lucio Cernadas
Horacio Garcia Tuñon
Carmelo C. Miguel
Hector Pelesson
Luis T. Saenz
Enrique Garda
Domingo Martinez
Rafael J. Macias.

A brief biography of each of the above-mentioned follows:

Brigadier General Francisco Reynolds.

Born in Buenos Aires in 1881. Entered the Military College when 14 years old and graduated in 1898 with the rank of junior lieutenant of artillery (alferez). Was promoted to lieutenant in 1903, to 1st lieutenant in 1906, to captain in 1909, to major in 1914, to lieutenant colonel in 1920 and to colonel in 1927.

While in the 2nd artillery with the rank of lieutenant, he took part in the uprising of 1905 and was confined to Rio Gallegos. When the amnesty was sanctioned, he was assigned to the 4th artillery, then stationed in Mendoza. In 1906 he was assigned to the German Army to perfect his technical knowledge and was attached to the 72nd artillery with headquarters at Danzig. Upon returning to this country, he continued his duties in the 4th, 3rd and 1st artillery. As lieutenant colonel, he was stationed in Military District No. 20 of Chascomus and then in command of the 1st artillery. From there he was transferred to the military districts of Moron and Zarate and in 1926 was appointed Military Attaché to the legations in Uruguay and Paraguay.

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After having commanded the artillery of the 3rd division of the Army, in 1929, he was detailed as superintendent of the Military College, San Martin, and in this post he played an important part in the Revolution of September, 1930. Since last year he has been Director General of Arsenals. He speaks German and English.

Brigadier General Andres Sabalain.

Entered the Military College in 1898 and left in 1902 with the rank of sub-lieutenant. After having served in the 5th cavalry and other units, in 1909 he was assigned as student at the Superior School of War. Three years later, he graduated and received his rating as an officer of the General Staff.

In 1915, he was promoted to major and the following year designated Instructor of Equitation at the Cavalry School. He remained in this post until in 1922 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel, at the same time being assigned to command the 2nd cavalry, and then Director of the School of Cavalry.

In 1926, he was promoted to colonel and shortly after was in command of the 2nd cavalry brigade until 1928 when he became inspector of military districts of the 5th division of the army. After the Revolution of September 6, 1930, he returned to the staff of the 2nd brigade and in 1931 was appointed cavalry inspector. At the beginning of 1932, he was appointed Director of the Remount Service, and is still in charge at the present time.

When the Mixed Detachment of Formosa was created (Destacamento Mixto Formosa), by reason of the Paraguayan - Bolivian conflict, General Sabalain was assigned to this command.

Brigadier-General Juan Pistarini

Entered the Military College in 1899, graduating with honors. For several years he served in the pontoon engineers and communication units, until he was sent to Germany to perfect his technical knowledge. Returning to the country, he took the course in the Superior Technical School and the Superior School of War (War College) graduating as military engineer and officer of the General Staff.

As a captain (1921), major and later lieutenant colonel, he taught in the Military College and also in the Superior School of War.

He later commanded various engineering battalions and was assigned as commanding officer of three

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grouped battalions of pontoon engineers in Parana. When the Foreign Purchasing Commission was created, General Pistarini was appointed President of the sub-committee of engineers.

Returning to the country, he was assigned as inspector of pontoon engineers. At the present time he is Chief of Engineers of the Ministry of War.

Colonel Manuel Castrillon.

First studied in Santa Fe, entering the Military College in 1905. Was promoted in succession to sub-lieutenant in 1908, to lieutenant in 1910, to 1st lieutenant in 1913, to captain in 1917, to major in 1922 and to lieut.col. in 1928. As captain, he was on duty in the School of Small Arms.

In the intervention in 1922 in the province of San Juan, he was political chief of the Department of Concepcion and Calingasta. The following year he was assigned and commanded the 2nd battalion of the 9th infantry and in 1928 was attached to the staff of the 1st division. From then on he was in command of the 6th and 12th infantry respectively. In 1933 he was appointed a member of the Permanent Courts Martial for non-commissioned officers and troops of the Capital, a post which he holds at the present time.

Colonel Rodolfo M. Lebrero.

Born in 1885. Entered the Army as a cadet in the Military College in 1905. Left that institute in 1908 as a sub-lieutenant of infantry, later serving in different units of that arm. He was in command of the 11th infantry in Rosario. After the Revolution of September, 1930, he was made Chief of Police of that city. He was promoted to major in 1922 and to lieutenant colonel in 1928. In 1931 he was appointed Foreign Liaison Officer of the 2nd Division of the Ministry of War. From there he was transferred to the secretary's office of the Direction General of Arsenals, a post which he holds at the present time.

Colonel Juan Carlos Bassi

Graduated from the Military College as sub-lieutenant of infantry in 1910. Promoted to lieutenant in 1912, to 1st lieutenant in 1915, to captain in 1918, to major in 1922 and to lieutenant colonel in 1928. Served in succession in the 17th infantry, School for Non-Commissioned Officers, General Staff and Military College. While at the Military College he was company commander and in command of the battalion of cadets.

He was a student in the School of Small Arms and the Superior School of War, graduating as an officer of the General Staff. He was Professor of Tactics in the Military College and the Superior Technical School. From 1927 to 1931 he was a member of

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the Foreign Purchasing Commission and on returning to this country he was appointed Professor of Military History in the Superior School of War, a post which he holds at the present time.

Colonel Juan Sanguinetti.

Born in 1890. Entered the Military College in 1907. Graduated in 1910 as sub-lieutenant of infantry. Served in various units of the Army until he was assigned as a student in the Superior School of War, graduating as an officer of the General Staff. Was promoted to major in 1922 and to lieutenant colonel in 1928. Shortly after the Revolution of September, 1930, he was assigned to command the 1st infantry up until 1932. Since then he has been acting as military secretary to the Minister of War.

Colonel Juan Lucio Cernadas.

In 1909 graduated from the Military College as sub-lieutenant of infantry. When a 1st lieutenant he was on duty in that same institute and was then assigned as a student at the Superior School of War. Promoted to major in 1922, he was assigned as a battalion commander of the 1st infantry. After this he was sub-director of the Infantry School. Henceforth he served on the General Staff and was an instructor of tactics in the Military College until he was appointed chief of the mobilization and organization division of the Geographical Institute. He was stationed at this post when the Revolution of September, 1930, took place and was then placed in command of the 1st infantry and of the forces which guarded the Government House. In December of that same year, he was appointed Military Attaché to Spain and while on that mission he was presented with the Cruz del Mérito Militar, which was the first military decoration conceded by the Spanish Republic to a foreign official. At the present time he is professor of tactics at the Superior School of War and in the Superior Technical School. He is the author of the works "Tactica integral" and "Memorandum del oficial y jefe de infanteria en el campo tactico."

Colonel Horacio García Tuñon

He began his military career in 1904, graduating from the Military College in 1907 as a sub-lieutenant of cavalry. As a junior officer, he served in various units of his arm. He was later assigned to take the regular course of the Superior School of War, graduating as an officer of the General Staff. In December, 1923, he was promoted to the rank of major and in 1928 to lieutenant colonel. He then assumed command of one of the cavalry brigades. At the present

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time he is attached to the Direction General of Personnel of the Ministry of War.

Colonel Carmelo C. Miguez

He entered the Military College in 1904 and graduated as a sub-lieutenant of cavalry in 1907. Upon graduation from that institute, he was assigned to the 3rd cavalry and from there to the Grenadiers where he remained for 10 years. After taking the course in the Superior School of War, he was assigned as 2nd in command of the 9th cavalry, chief of the Mobilization Division of the Direction of Administration and the Direction of Aeronautics, quarter-master (intendente) of Campo Los Andes (Remount Station) and Commanding Officer of the 12th cavalry.

In 1933 he was detailed as Chief of the Remount Service and until quite recently was inspector of military districts of the 1st division of the Army. On the occasion of the events of 1918 (Chilean incursions), he was sent with his squadron of the 2nd cavalry to the region of Lake Buenos Aires in Santa Cruz. He was a member of the forces which were sent to Boulogne-sur-Mer, France, on the occasion of the unveiling of the statue of San Martin, and to Chile during the centenary of that country. In 1917 as military attaché to the mission headed by Dr. Fernando Saguier, he went to Bolivia, Peru and Chile.

Colonel Hector Pelesson

After obtaining his bachelor's degree in the University, he entered the Military College, graduating as a sub-lieutenant of cavalry in 1908. Was promoted to lieutenant in 1911, to 1st lieutenant in 1913, to captain in 1918, to major in 1923 and to lieutenant colonel in 1928. Upon leaving the Military College, he served for seven years in the Regiment of Mounted Grenadiers. While still a sub-lieutenant, he was sent with that unit to France on the occasion of the unveiling of the monument to San Martin in Boulogne-sur-Mer. Later he was Commander of the Cadet Squadron of the Military College and afterwards became an officer of the General Staff. After having been in command of the 1st division of the Army, he was instructor of tactics at the War College (Escuela Superior). Immediately after the Revolution of September, he was appointed Commanding Officer of the Regiment of Grenadiers, a post which he held until several months ago. At the present time, he is military attaché to the Argentine Embassy in Rome.

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Colonel Luis T.Saenz

Born in 1885. Entered the Military College in 1905. Promoted to sub-lieutenant of artillery in 1906, he was detailed in succession to various units of his arm. Some years later he took a complete course in the Artillery School and afterwards attended the Superior School of War. He was promoted to major in 1921 and to lieutenant colonel in 1927. During the last few years, he has been assigned to the Inspection General's Department. At the present time he is command of artillery (Brigade Commanding Officer) of the 4th division of the army with headquarters in Cordoba.

Colonel Enrique Garda.

Born in 1889. Entered the Military College in 1906. As a junior artillery officer, he was detailed in succession to various units of his arm. He was promoted to major in 1922 and to lieutenant colonel in 1927. During the intervention of General Gregorio Velez in the Province of Salta, he was appointed Chief of Police. At the present time he is in command of artillery of the 5th division of the Army, with headquarters in Salta.

Colonel Domingo Martinez

Born in 1888. Entered the Military College in 1905. In 1911 he was appointed instructor of gunnery and assistant professor of physics and mathematics in that institute. In 1913 he was promoted to 1st lieutenant and detailed to the 3rd military district and to the Office of the Chief of Engineers. He took the engineering course in the University of Buenos Aires and received his diploma as a civil engineer in 1915. He was then detailed to the General Staff. In 1922 was promoted to major and as such was active in various artillery units. Was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1928. For about four years he has been active on the Foreign Purchasing Commission in Europe. He is the author of several important technical works among which are the following: "Aplicación del cálculo de probabilidades al tiro de artillería" and "Apuntes sobre preparación del tiro de artillería con blancos auxiliares."

Colonel Rafael J.Macias.

Born in 1890. Entered the Military College in 1908. Graduated as sub-lieutenant of engineers in 1911. Was detailed in succession to various units of pontoon engineers and communications. Later was a

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student at the Superior School of War. In 1925 was promoted to major and 4 years later to lieutenant colonel. Until the beginning of this year, was Director of the School of Communications of El Palomar. At the present time, he is on duty in the Direction General of Communications.

Tucker D. Sharp
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Enclosures
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Record Section File No.

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For Record Section Only

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

MILITARY ATTACHE REPORT Argentina.....
Country Reported On

Subject Sympathies of Argentine Army Officers..... I.G. No. 5990.....
Brief Descriptive Title

REC'D. G-2 JUL 3 1941

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Personal contacts. And Argentine Who's Who.

Summarization of Report

When Required Argentine Officers of suspected or known Totalitarian leanings
and some considered pro-Ally.

Where no definite information is given, nothing definite is
known.

In Comments on Current Events Enter Item Headings Here

Accame, Nicolás C.; General de División
1906-1907 German Dragoon Regiment No. 10; as a First Lieutenant.
1909-1910 Commission of Acquisitions of Armaments in Foreign Countries;
as a Captain.
1923-24 Military Attaché to the Argentine Embassy in Rome; as a Lt.
Col. and Colonel.
Commander of the Order of the Crown of Italy.
Known pro-Nazi.

Alvarez, Avelino J; General de División; speaks German; retired 1940;
was Military Attaché in Great Britain; received in 1939 the Great
Cross of Military Merit.

Allaria, Angel P.; General de Division; retired 1916; was Minister of
War 1912-1916.

Arandazi, Gerardo; General de División; retired 1925; as a Colonel
went to Germany to study 1911-1913.

Baldrich, Alonso; General de Brigada; retired; was in Europe with
the Armaments' Commission and belonged to a Pioneer Battalion
of the German army; later was General Manager of oil fields owned
by Argentine company YPF; published several books about the petroleum
question, one of which, "Rivalidad de la potencias imperialistas
en torno al petróleo", was anti-imperialistic; member of the
Instituto Cultural Argentino Japonés since 1938.

Becke, Carlos von der; General de Brigada; CIC of the 4th Division
in Córdoba; Military Attaché in Berlin 1930-32, as a Colonel; German
War Academy, Berlin 1932; Cross of the German Eagle, First Class,
1938.
Known pro-Nazi.

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Best, Felix; Colonel; Professor of the War College.

Beverine, Juan; Colonel, retired; was incorporated in the German army in 1917 and was in a special mission in Italy; writes in newspapers, including La Prensa, about historical military topics.

Biedma, Baldomero de; Colonel; Professor in the War College; speciality is frontier questions.

Casanova, Carlos; General de Brigada; retired 1933; Military Attaché in Brasil 1930-32 as a Colonel.

Casinelli, Luis A.; General de Division; General Inspector of the Army; was in the German Artillery School at Jüterbog; Commander of the Order of the British Empire and the Italian Crown and of other decorations, none of which are from Germany.

Costa, Julio C.; General de Division; 1908 served in the German Infantry Regiment 118 in Worms as First Lieutenant.

De Rocha, Alberto; Major, retired 1939; military writer, contributes to Catholic papers.

Dellepiane, Luis J.; General de Division; retired 1930; 1903 Military Attaché in Berlin as a Colonel; Minister of War 1928-1930.

Diana, Amaya Justo Emilio; Lt. Col. retired; Argentine Consul General in Valparaiso; 1904-1905 in the German Dragoon Regiment 12; 1923-1929 Consul in Berlin; wrote books and articles in Spanish and German; German Red Cross Order; was a professor in the University of Berlin. Known pro-Nazi.

Duval, Miguel; General de Brigada; retired 1933; 1909-1911 German Dragoon Regiment 6 as a First Lieutenant; Governor of the Pampa Territory; collaborator of Skoda, General Electric and Osaka Syosen Kaisya.

Espíndola, Adolfo Salvador; General de Brigada; was sent to Germany in 1914 to do service in an artillery regiment but came back when war broke out; 1937-1940 Military and Aeronautical Attaché to the Embassy in Berlin and in Switzerland; German Eagle Cross First Class. Was definitely pro-Nazi, but it is believed (wishfully) that he is swinging over.

Fantini Pertiné, Ernesto; Colonel; retired 1940; was Military Attaché in France; military writer, published books and articles in La Razón and La Nación; lawyer and college teacher.

Farrell, Edelmito J.; Colonel; 1924-1926 did service in the Italian Alpine Regiments 4 and 7 as a Major; Officer of the Crown of Italy.

Fernández, Carlos María; General de Brigada; retired 1925; 1888-89 Belgian Military College, Ypres, Belgium as a Lieutenant; 1892-96 member of Technical Armaments' Commission in Germany as a Captain; 1921 studied military administration of the Armies in France, Germany, England, Italy, Belgium, Austria, Spain and Portugal; military writer.

Fernández, Ladislao M.; Lieutenant General, Engineer; geographic studies in Europe; builder of arsenals and barracks.

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Fernandez Valdez, Eduardo; General de Brigada retired; 1923-25 Military Attaché in Spain and Portugal as a Colonel; Spanish decorations.

Florit, Ernesto; Colonel; 1928 Military Attaché in France and Belgium; 1932 Military Adviser to the Argentine Delegation of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva; wrote a book about Foch.
Pro-French.

García, Saturnino E.; Lieutenant General retired.

Giovanelli, Jorge A; General de Brigada; studied in France; 1937-38 Military Attaché in France; Legion d' Honneur.
Pro-French.

Gras, Martin; General de Brigada; C.I.C. Argentine Cavalry Troops; 1911-13 incorporated in the German army as a First Lieutenant; 1926-30 Military Attaché in Italy; Italian decorations; translated German Cavalry regulations from German to Spanish; member of the German Riding Club, also Rotary Club.
Definitely pro-Nazi.

Guido Lavalle, Francisco; General de División retired 1939; Legion d' Honneur.

Idouate, Camilo; General de División retired; 1920-23 Military Attaché in Italy as Lt. Colonel; was president of the Argentine Automobile Club.
Pro-Strong government.

Jauregui, Julián Enrique; General de Brigada; retired 1935; 1909 Military Technical Academy, Berlin as a Captain; 1912 specially invited to German army manoeuvres as a Major; 1930 specially invited to Japanese army manoeuvres as a Colonel; military writer.
Pro-German.

Jones, Juan Román; General de Brigada; 1908 military training in Germany as a Captain; 1924 member of the Purchase Commission of Armaments in Europe as a Colonel; speaks German is his home.
Definitely pro-Nazi.

Justo, Agustín P.; General División retired; former President.
Relatively pro-Ally.

Kelso, Carlos; Colonel; was Chief of the Military House of the Presidency; 1925 was Adjutant to the Prince of Wales during his visit to Argentina.
de

Márquez, Carlos D.; General/División; General Quartermaster of the Army 1935-37 member and president of the Armaments' Purchase Commission in Europe; former Minister of War.
Considered friendly to democracies.

Márquez, Rodolfo; General de Brigada; 1924-26 member of the Armaments' Purchase Commission in Europe; diploma as a General Staff officer of the United States; doubtful.

Martínez Pita, Rodolfo; General de División; retired 1937; Artillery and Engineering College in Fontainebleau, France; Superior War College of Paris; 1906-07 served in the German army as a Captain; was president of the Armaments' Purchase Commission in Europe; belongs to scientific societies and to the Cercle Interallié de Paris; military writer.
Pro-Nazi.

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Medina, Francisco; General de División retired; 1930-32 War Minister under Uriburu.
Very pro-Nazi.

Miranda, Abel; General de Brigada; 1925-27 served with the Italian mountain troops as a Lt. Colonel.
Considered friendly to democracies.

Mohr, Guillermo José; General de División; visited U.S.
Apparently pro-U.S.

Molina, Juan Bautista; General de Brigada; retired 1939; 1911-13 served in the German army; president of the Armaments' Purchase Commission in Brussels and Paris; leader of nationalist movement.
Very pro-Nazi.

Molina, Ramón; General de División; retired 1937; 1911 served in the German army; 1912 served with the Bulgarian army in the Bulgarian-Turkish war; 1928-30 Military Attaché in Madrid; military and political writer; doubtful.

Mones Ruiz, Raul; General de Brigada; retired; 1908-09 Military Shooting School Germany as a First Lieutenant; 1923-25 Military Attaché in London as a Lt. Colonel; 1928-29 Member of the Armaments' Purchase Commission in Europe; 1937-39 president of the Armaments' Commission in France as a General.

Monferini, Juan Manuel; General de Brigada; 1912-14 served in the German Infantry Regiment 85 as a First Lieutenant; military writer.

Ornstein, Leopoldo R.; Lt. Colonel; writes about military history; translated German and French military regulations.
Pro-German Jew. A local "Dreyfus".

Parodi Torre, Antonio; Aviation Colonel; 1923-26 president of the Purchase Commission for planes in Europe; Legion d'Honneur; German Eagle Meritry Cross First Class(1939); Commander of the Crown of Italy (1939).
Pro-Nazi. Now in U.S.

Pertiné, Basilio V.; General de División; retired 1936; Artillery School, Spandau, Germany; 1910-18 Military Attaché in Germany; 1933-36 president of the Armaments' Purchase Commission in Europe; 1936-38 War Minister in the Justo Cabinet; served in the German Infantry Regiment 81 in Frankfort , during World War I in the German Headquarters; German Iron Cross Second Class; Prussian Crown Order with swords; Red Eagle of Germany, Second Class; Austrian Military Medal; Great Cross of the Crown of Italy and others from neutral countries.
Very pro-Nazi.

Pilotto, Enrique; Colonel; retired 1930; Governor of the territory of Neuquén; two years in the German army as a Captain; 1927-28 technical adviser of the Argentine delegation to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva.
Pro-Nazi

Pistarini, Juan; General de División; Military Engineer; served in the German army; was a member of the Armaments' Commission in Europe; was Inspector of Argentine officers studying in Europe; was president of the Armaments' Commission in Europe.

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Pommiez, Julio; General de Brigada; retired.

Quiroga, Antonio; General de Brigada; retired.

Ramirez, Pedro; General de Brigada; 1931-32 Military Attaché in Rome as a Lt. Colonel; 1911-13 served in the German Hussar Regiment No. 5 as a First Lieutenant.

Rawson, Antonio; General de Brigada; wrote books, articles for La Nación and La Prensa about military topics.
Pro-Nazi.

Raybaud, Eduardo; General de Brigada; retired; 1906 special mission in Belgium; 1911-13 Military Attaché in London; 1913 Adjutant to President Theodore Roosevelt during his visit to Buenos Aires; 1914-18 Military Attaché in Washington.

Reynolds, Francisco; General de División; 1906-07 served in the German Field Artillery Regiment 72 as a First Lieutenant; 1907 served in the German Foot Artillery Regiment 2.
Fascist.

Ricci, Antonio E.; Major; retired 1932; Consul General in Rio.

Rocca, Lucas; General de Brigada; retired 1933; 1928-29 trip to Spain, Italy, France, Switzerland, Belgium and England; writes for La Prensa and La Nación.
Pro-Ally.

Rocco, Pedro Julian; General de División; special training for communications with Infantry in Germany; German Order of the Red Eagle Second Class.

Rojas, Miguel J.; First Lieutenant; retired 1932; private secretary of General Justo.
Pro-Ally.

Ruzo, Benedicto; General de División; retired 1939; Military Attaché in Germany and Switzerland.
Pro-Ally.

Sabellán, Anarés; General de Brigada; retired 1938; was Chief of Police in Buenos Aires from 1938-40.

Saforcadá, Ergasto Ramón; General de Brigada; retired; 1909 served in the German Infantry Regiment 81.

Saraputa, Pedro N.; Colonel; retired 1931; present director of the National Prison.

Sarobe, José María; General de Brigada; 1930-31 Military Attaché in Japan; 1927 instruction course for Generals and Colonels of the French army at Versailles.
Pro-Ally.

Sartori, Emilio Vicente; General de División; retired 1935; 1906-07 served in a German Cavalry Regiment; 1929 with mission to Europe; was Adjutant to Prince Henry of Prussia (1914) and the Prince of Wales (1931); decorations from Prussia and England.

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Sola, Ricardo; General de División; retired 1928; Provincial Senator of Salta; 1895-97 Purchase Commission of Pioneer Material in Europe; German Red Eagle; military writer.

Tonazzi, Juan N.; General de Brigada; Minister of War; 1925-26 Military Attaché in Italy; Crown Order of Italy.
Believed pro-Ally.

Vazareza, Juan Esteban; General de División; retired; 1919 Military Attaché in Washington; 1936-38 Chief of Police in Buenos Aires.

Vedia, Nicolás Agustín de; General de División; retired; writer.

Velez, Francisco M; General de División; retired; National Deputy(dead); Studied Superior War College in Berlin; 1920-22 Military Attaché in Spain and Portugal.

Verdaguer, Armando; General de Brigada; retired 1940; 1937 as Chief of the Army Air Force made an inspection trip to Germany and Italy, bought German planes without authority and lost job; Order of the German Eagle with stars and meritory cross (1938); Order of the Crown of Italy(1939).
Nazi.

Vernengo, Aníbal J.; General de División; retired 1934; 1911 German Artillery Regiment 5 in Karlsruhe as Lt. Colonel; 1929 visit to Europe on official mission; military writer in La Prensa, La Nación and La Razón; also writes books.
Doubtful.

Zambianchi, Federico; Lt. Colonel; retired 1935; Governor of the Territory of Formosa.

Zanni, Pedro Leandro; Colonel; Air Attaché in Washington; Air Attaché in Tokio, Paris, London and Brussels; decorations from France and Japan.
Pro-Ally.

Zuloaga, Angel María; General de Brigada; C.I.C. Argentine Air Force; Air School, Avord, France; 1916 Air Attaché in Paris as a First Lieutenant; 1926-30 Air Attaché in Washington as a Lt. Colonel; 1936-38 member of the Armaments' Purchase Commission in Europe; French, British, Polish and Italian decorations; writer on military and aviation topics; not intelligent.
Pro-Nazi.

John W. Lang
John W. Lang
Colonel, Inf.
Military Attaché

All copies airmailed June 25, 1941